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A BSTRA CT
This thesis studies three interrelated aspects of skill accumulation in macro­
economics. Each thesis chapter targets different aspects of skill accumulation in 
a macroeconomic environment: role of trade, role of outside ownership of assets, 
and role of unemployment. The chapters are thematically united in an explana­
tory approach which targets market incompleteness which arises from failures of 
intertemporal commitment: commitment to repay debt, commitment to acquire 
specific skills and commitment to form future productive matches.
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1 In trodu ction
This thesis studies three interrelated aspects of skill accumulation in macroeco­
nomics. Each thesis chapter targets different aspects of skill accumulation in a 
macroeconomic environment: role of trade (Chapter 2), role of outside ownership 
of assets (Chapter 3), and role of unemployment (Chapter 4). Despite this, the 
chapters are thematically united in an explanatory approach which targets market 
incompleteness which arises from failures of intertemporal commitment: commit­
ment to repay debt (Chapter 2), commitment to acquire specific skills (Chapter 
3) and commitment to form future productive matches (Chapter 4).
The macroeconomic evironments studied here are key to the individuals in­
centives to acquire skills. In the framework of chapter 2, the complementarity 
between old skilled and young unskilled labor in each technology implies that 
young agents’s incentives to enter particular technologies are dependent on past 
decisions to enter technologies by previous generations. In the framework of chap­
ter 3, the supply of assets across technologies where agents can commit to acquire 
asset specific skills will determine young agents’s incentives to enter each technol­
ogy. The supply of such assets is dependent on previous generations’s decisions 
to enter technologies. In the framework of chapter 4, agents incentives to acquire 
skills are dependent on their job matching prospects which are a function of the 
aggregate vacancy to unemployment ratio.
Another major unifying theme of this thesis is the adoption of the overlap­
ping generations framework. This is an essential methodology for analyzing the 
repeated incentives to acquire skills by a constant arrival of new labor market 
entrants in an economy with a stationary population. Chapters 3 and 4 adopt the 
two period overlapping generations model of Allias (1947), Samuelson (1958) and 
Diamond (1965), while chapter 4 adopts the perpetual youth model of Blanchard 
(1985).
C hapter 2
Chapter 2 begins by developing a theory of total factor productivity differ­
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ences in a framework of technology diffusion. I show how in countries with tighter 
borrowing constraints, frontier technologies diffuse more slowly, and old outdated 
technologies continue to be used. I then analyze how countries with different bor­
rowing constraints specialize across new and old technologies through two forms 
of intra-industry trade. First, I consider international factor mobility and inter­
pret this as a form of (vertically differentiated) intermediate goods trade. Second, 
I consider trade in (vertically differentiated) final goods. Under both forms of 
trade, poor countries with tighter borrowing constraints exploit their comparative 
advantage through specializing in older technologies. However, under intermediate 
goods trade, poor countries can adopt new technologies faster by gaining access 
to inputs which complement the use of newer technologies. The patterns of spe­
cialization across technologies are dramatically different under each form of trade. 
Despite this, both forms of trade are consistent with total factor productivity 
divergence between countries with different borrowing constraints.
At the heart of the economic forces analyzed in Chapter 2 is the inability of 
multi- period lived agents to borrow against their old period product when young. 
Countries differ in their ability to solve this borrowing constraint problem which 
results in their differentiated use of technologies which are in the public domain 
of the world. The latter occurs in the context of a canonical model of technology 
diffusion of Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), where agents using newer technologies 
are associated with a greater demand for borrowing in equilibrium.
C hapter 3
In the third chapter of the thesis I explore in greater detail how economies try 
to overcome this borrowing problem through the ownership structure of assets. In 
particular, I show how in a Grossman-Hart-Moore world of incomplete contracts 
(Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)), the borrowing constraint 
problem of agents who acquire asset specific skills can be overcome when other 
agents outside the production process own assets (outside ownership).
Chapter 3 shows when agents undertake multi period projects where (i) they
7
acquire asset specific skills over time, and (ii) they are borrowing constrained, 
outside ownership of assets can improve outcomes. When agents cannot commit 
to acquire asset specific skills, they are self employed. In the economy described, 
self employed "entrepreneurs" carry out new projects which in subsequent repeti­
tions of the project implement outside ownership of assets. Outside owners hire 
"managers" to repeat projects. A necessary condition for entrepreneurs and man­
agers to coexist, is tha t entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained. My theory of 
entrepreneurs coincides with their empirical identification as (i) the self employed 
who are (ii) borrowing constrained.
Another set of necessary conditions for entrepreneurs and managers to coexist 
is the continuous entry and exit of finite lived projects. After re-labeling assets 
under outside ownership as "firms", a reduced form characterization of the model 
coincides exactly with the canonical industry equilibrium model of Hopenhayn 
(1992). In this sense, my theory provides microfoundations for the interpretation 
of "firms" in tha t framework.
In the Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) framework of Chapter 2, new and old tech­
nologies coexist because of the following trade-off: new technologies have higher 
total factor productivity but a scarcity of skilled labor, old technologies have 
lower total factor productivity but an abundance of skilled labor and skilled and 
unskilled labor are complements.
Chapter 3 develops an alternative theory of technology diffusion based on 
the following trade-off: new technologies have higher total factor productivity 
but agents cannot commit to acquire asset specific skills, old technologies have 
lower total factor productivity but agents can commit to acquiring asset specific 
skills. W hether agents can commit to acquire asset specific skills or not determines 
whether the production process can exploit the gains from outside ownership of 
assets.
C hapter 4
The final chapter of the thesis explores the incentives to acquire skills in an
environment where contractual incompleteness arises naturally. Workers acquire 
general skills before they are matched with firms, the identity of which is unknown 
at the time of skill acquisition. The latter means firms cannot be parties to 
contracts written when skills are acquired. Due to search frictions in matches 
between workers and firms, matched workers and firms bargain over a bilateral 
surplus which is increasing in the level of general skills. Since workers must share 
part of the marginal product of their general skills, the contractual incompleteness 
is associated with a hold-up problem of inefficient investment.
Chapter 4 analyses the correlation between employment duration, unemploy­
ment duration and general skill accumulation in a search equilibrium. I show how 
the level of general skills and the duration of employment are positively corre­
lated, and both variables are negatively correlated with the duration of unemploy­
ment spells. W ith search frictions, general skill accumulation is associated with 
a hold up problem since it benefits future job vacancies which workers expect to 
be matched with. However, if vacancies direct their search to workers of differ­
ent skill levels, workers indirectly internalize this externality. 1 derive conditions 
under which skill accumulation is fully efficient, f also show how Becker’s general 
skill finance rule is modified for a search economy. Extensions analyze indirect 
complementarities between general and job specific skill accumulation, and the 
decision of whether to accumulate skills through training or education.
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2 B orrow ing C onstraints and T echnology D iffu­
sion: Im plications o f In tra-industry  Trade
An emerging view attributes much of the differences in per capita income levels 
across countries, to differences in total factor productivity (T F P ).1 This has moti­
vated Prescott (1998) to call for a “theory of T FP  differences” . If technologies are 
in the international public domain, an explanation for these persistent T FP  dif­
ferences must be framed in terms of differences in barriers to the adoption of new, 
high T FP  technologies [Parente and Prescott (1994)]. More specifically, a theory 
of T FP  differences needs to address two observations: (i) why is the diffusion of 
frontier technologies slower in poor countries, and (ii) why do poor countries con­
tinue to use and invest in old technologies which have long been discarded from 
production in rich countries?
This chapter develops a theory of T FP  differences in a framework of technology 
diffusion. The source of my TFP differences are exogenous differences in borrow­
ing possibilities, which result from differences in the quality of institutions which 
enforce external investor rights. When new technologies are associated with higher 
“investment” relative to old technologies, tighter borrowing constraints lower out­
put by distorting the allocation of inputs away from high investment activities to 
low investment activities.
This theory is applied to consider the impact of intra-industry trade on the 
magnitude of the T FP  differences which arise. A running debate in the empir­
ical literature on international technology diffusion is why increased trade and 
technology transfer between rich and poor countries leads to ambiguous effects on 
the T FP  of poor countries, and ambiguous effects on convergence in T FPs be­
tween rich and poor countries [Coe and Helpman (1995), Keller (1998), Rodriguez 
and Rodrik (1999)]. Among different forms of trade, this literature finds stronger 
evidence of T FP  growth in poor countries looking at intermediate goods trade
1 K lenow  and  R odrigues-C lare  (1997). and Hall and  Jones (1999) conclude th a t a b o u t 509c 
of per c a p ita  incom e differences can be tra ced  to  T F P  differences.
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alone [Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997), Meyer(2001)].2 I set out to show 
how despite trade, the T FP  differences which arise from differences in borrowing 
constraints do not subside. Indeed, under some forms of trade, T F P  differences 
diverge.
I address the heterogeneity of T FP  outcomes under different forms of trade by 
considering two forms of intra-industry trade. First, I analyze international mobil­
ity of factor inputs and go on to interpret this as a form of (vertically differentiated) 
intermediate goods trade. Second, I analyze trade in (vertically differentiated) fi­
nal goods. In this process, I clarify the interaction between two intuitive forces of 
trade. First, trade leads poor countries to further specialization in old technologies 
for which they have a comparative advantage (a force for lower incomes). Second, 
trade leads poor countries to access inputs which complement the use of new tech­
nologies (a force for higher incomes). Under intermediate goods trade both forces 
of trade are present, under final goods trade only the first force is present.
The pattern of specialization across technologies is dramatically different un­
der each form of trade. Intermediate goods trade results in countries with tighter 
borrowing constraints discarding the very old and very new vintage technologies 
they use under no trade, and specializing in the intermediate vintage technologies. 
Interm ediate goods trade is consistent with T F P  convergence or divergence be­
tween countries with different borrowing constraints. Trade in final goods results 
in countries with tighter borrowing constraints specializing in the very old vintage 
technologies compared to before trade. Trade in final goods is inconsistent with 
T FP  convergence between countries with different borrowing constraints.
Chari and Hopenhayn (1991) present a canonical analysis of technology diffu­
sion in their “vintage human capital” model. The application of tha t framework 
to borrowing constraints and intra-industry trade constitutes the core of this chap­
ter. Among models of technology diffusion the vintage human capital model is 
unique in predicting continued entry and investment in old technologies. Other
1 K eller (2001) provides an  up to  d a te  review  o f th is  li te ra tu re .
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models of diffusion which rely on uncertainty of new technologies, strategic issues, 
or spillover effects seem inappropriate to the question at hand.
The exogenous role of enforcement institutions on economic performance is 
motivated by the literature on financial development (or deepening) and growth. 
The quality of enforcement institutions are directly linked to the volume of fi­
nancial trade in an economy. In early seminal work, Goldsmith (1969) estab­
lished a correlation between economic and financial development by measuring 
the value of financial intermediary assets to GNP, while country case studies by 
Cameron (1967) dissected historical relationships between banking development 
and early industrialization to suggest tha t the former had an independent and pos­
itive growth-inducing role. The modern revival of empirical studies begins with 
King and Levine (1993) and is reviewed in Levine (1997). Recently, Rousseau 
(2002) applies standard tools in empirical macroeconomics to link financial revo­
lutions over the past 400 years to surges in real sector activity.
These studies do not unambiguously resolve the issue of causality between en­
forcement institutions and growth, but recent progress has been made on this front. 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) show how various 
measures of investor rights are systematically linked to the legal origin of enforce­
ment institutions. Since countries typically adopted one of four legal systems 
(English, French, German, Scandinavian) through occupation or colonization, the 
implied differences in investor rights are seen as exogenous. In the literature on 
finance and growth, the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny indices of 
investor rights and legal origin are used as instruments to extract the exogenous 
component of financial development and control for simultaneity bias. In particu­
lar, studies find tha t the main channel through which financial development and 
investor rights affect growth is through T FP  rather than through savings or capital 
accumulation levels [Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), Wurgler (2000)]. Instead of 
highlighting the identity of colonizers, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
argue tha t the conditions for settlement by colonizers came to determine institu­
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tional quality. Using colonialist mortality rates as instruments for institutional 
quality, they find large effects of this variable on current per capita income levels.3
Although the environment studied is inherently dynamic, it is possible to in­
troduce many of the main mechanisms of the theory in term s of a simple static 
economy (readers may skip this by going to the penultimate paragraph of the in­
troduction). Consider a stationary two period overlapping generations economy, 
where ex ante identical agents can become entrepreneurs or workers. Workers earn 
a constant wage in both periods of their lives. Entrepreneurs hire workers from 
competitive labor markets and maximize profits subject to a production function 
which is concave in worker inputs. To become an entrepreneur, every agent must 
acquire skills through learning-by-doing in youth, and in youth such agents receive 
a fixed income. Equilibrium wages equalize the utility of ex ante identical agents 
across occupations. Since entrepreneurs earn more than workers, lifetime earnings 
profiles are steeper for agents planning to become entrepreneurs, and such agents 
are “investing” in youth in terms of foregone earnings.
Suppose agents have concave utility functions over consumption in each period 
of their lives. Compare outcomes when subject to budget constraints (i) young 
agents can borrow as much as they like, and (ii) they can only commit a fixed 
share of their old period incomes as collateral for loans: borrowing constraints. 
In the first case, equilibrium wages equalize discounted lifetime earnings across 
occupations. In the second case, the equilibrium wage is lower, because borrowing 
constraints have a greater disutility effect on young agents with steeper earnings 
profiles, who plan to become entrepreneurs. In this second case, although life­
time utilities are lower, discounted lifetime earnings are higher for entrepreneurs. 
Meanwhile, for workers, discounted lifetime earnings are lower. Since entrepre­
neurs’ input demands are higher, the share of entrepreneurs in the economy must
O n th e  o th e r  hand . R a ja n  an d  Z ingales (2001) show  th a t  financial developm ent m ay not 
he m ono ton ic  over tim e, and  propose an in terest g roup  th eo ry  of financial developm ent. My 
arg u m en t only relies on s tab le  differences in enforcem ent in s titu tio n s , a n d  rem ains valid as long 
as in s ti tu tio n s  are  not endogenous to  th e  o th e r variables u n d er analysis.
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fall. Borrowing constraints lower aggregate output by distorting the allocation of 
agents across the two occupations.
Next, suppose tha t the two cases describe two coexisting economies in the 
world, and consider outcomes under free international mobility of agents (i.e. 
factor price equalization). Let every young agent be subject to the borrowing 
constraints prevailing in her country of origin. Agents who do not face borrow­
ing constraints are sorted into steep earnings profile occupations (entrepreneurs), 
while agents who face borrowing constraints are sorted into shallow earnings pro­
file occupations (workers). Consider two possible outcomes. If all agents from the 
borrowing constrained economy become workers, the discounted value of lifetime 
earnings are equalized across the world. If all agents from the borrowing uncon­
strained economy become entrepreneurs, agents from this economy have higher 
discounted lifetime earnings, while average discounted lifetime earnings for the 
economy with borrowing constraints falls. International mobility of agents does 
not necessarily imply that lifetime earnings converge across economies.
Earnings outcomes under international mobility of agents are identical to out­
comes where only entrepreneurs are internationally mobile. Suppose one reinter­
prets the mobility of entrepreneurs as the mobility of intermediate goods that 
they produce: i.e. workers are indifferent between working with entrepreneurs 
or working with intermediate goods tha t entrepreneurs produce. Then, outcomes 
under international mobility are interpreted as those under trade in intermediate 
goods. This analysis already captures two different forces associated with inter­
mediate goods trade. First, agents from economies differentiated by borrowing 
constraints exploit their comparative advantage by increased specialization across 
occupations. Second, intermediate goods trade allows agents in the poorer, bor­
rowing constrained economy to participate in a more efficient use of the given 
technologies.
Now consider final goods trade. Suppose there is no mobility of agents or inter­
mediate goods trade. In each period, a new “fashion” introduces a differentiated
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good and agents can become fashion specific entrepreneurs through learning-by- 
doing in youth. It takes one period for a new good to become unfashionable, and 
all unfashionable goods are perfect substitutes. Although all entrepreneurs and 
workers produce one period old unfashionable goods, next period’s entrepreneurs 
produce a fixed amount of fashionable goods in the current period. The relative 
price of fashionable goods is increasing in the scarcity of fashionable goods relative 
to unfashionable goods. Suppose our two coexisting economies do not engage in 
any final goods trade. Since there are fewer entrepreneurs in the borrowing con­
strained economy, in every period the fashionable good is relatively scarce, and 
the its relative price is higher.
Next, suppose there is trade in fashionable and unfashionable goods. In the 
borrowing constrained economy, the relative price of fashionable goods will fall. 
Just like the effect of tighter borrowing constraints, this has a greater disutility 
effect on young agents who plan to become entrepreneurs, so equilibrium worker 
wages will fall. In the economy without borrowing constraints the relative price of 
fashionable goods will rise. This has a greater utility effect on young agents who 
plan to become entrepreneurs, so equilibrium worker wages will rise. As in the case 
of intermediate goods trade, the allocation of labor across occupations diverges as 
a result of trade. This captures the fact tha t economies exploit their comparative 
advantage across occupations. However, unlike the case with intermediate goods 
trade, this is the result of diverging factor prices (worker wages). Final goods trade 
is not associated with agents in the borrowing constrained economy participating 
in a more efficient use of the given technologies. Overall, the per capita incomes 
of the two economies must diverge.
In the general framework considered, there is an (exogenously) ever-growing 
set of technologies which can be ranked according to their TFP. W ithin each tech­
nology, entrepreneurs hire workers to maximize profits. Young agents can become 
technology specific entrepreneurs through acquiring skills as technology specific 
workers in youth. Since entrepreneurs in new technologies are more productive,
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young workers entering relatively older technologies are compensated with higher 
wages in youth, and this ensures tha t entrepreneurs in newer technologies earn 
more than entrepreneurs in older technologies. Earnings profiles are steeper, the 
newer the technologies tha t young workers enter into. The number of coexisting 
technologies (and occupations) is endogenous and is determined by the youngest 
technology such that old, skilled agents in th a t technology prefer to be work­
ers in another technology rather than utilizing their skills as entrepreneurs. The 
mechanisms introduced above are considerably strengthened and clarified by endo- 
genizing the number of coexisting occupations which agents choose to participate 
in. In particular, the effects of borrowing constraints and intra-industry trade 
on the distribution of the workforce across technology vintages constitute the key 
findings.
My theory of TFP differences complements existing work which has consid­
ered monopoly rights [Parente and Prescott(1999)], vested interests [Krusell and 
Rios-Rull (1996)], capital labour ratios [Basu and Weil (1998)] and ratios of skilled 
to unskilled labour [Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2000)]. Jovanovic (1998) presents a 
model of income inequality which results from different vintages of physical capital 
which are indivisible. In that paper, he makes a general point th a t frameworks of 
inequality can help us understand why despite the mobility of factors of produc­
tion, international income inequalities may not disappear. My analysis of trade 
is related to this point. By linking financial development to technology adop­
tion, this paper adds to a literature including Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and Parente (1994).
Section 1 presents the basic model and conducts comparative statics with bor­
rowing constraints. Section 2 applies the model to trade in intermediate goods 
and trade in final goods. The last section concludes.
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2.1 M o d e l
2.1.1 Preferences
Consider a two period overlapping generations economy, populated by ex ante 
identical agents who have preferences of the Cobb-Douglas form,
u = y / c ^  (1)
c\ denotes consumption in youth, and o2 denotes consumption in old age. A 
constant population of agents is born every period. Agents can borrow from inter­
national capital markets, and face an exogenous world interest factor R  > 1. Let
y 1 and y-> denote young and old period earnings respectively. The lifetime budget 
constraint of a worker is,
1 1
Cl +  ~R°2 ~  yi ~Ryi
In credit markets, the imperfect enforcement of investor rights means tha t young 
agents can only borrow up to a fraction (9, of their discounted old period earnings 
for young period consumption,
ci -  2/i < (3)
Borrowing constraints arise because borrowers cannot credibly commit to use more 
than a fraction 9 of their old period earnings as collateral.4
2 .1 .2  T echnology
Agents inhabit a ‘Vintage human capital” economy. In every period, a frontier
technology is exogenously introduced whose T FP  is 7  > 1 times greater than the
T F P  of last period’s frontier technology. Let r  G {0,1, 2,...} index the vintage or
1 T h e  ina lienab ility  of fu tu re  earn ings from agents m eans th a t  th e  ex post ex p ro p ria tio n
problem  is p a rticu la rly  severe in th is s itu a tio n  (com pared  to  borrow ing  aga in s t physical cap ita l) ,
and  th e  role of th ird  party  enforcem ent of investor righ ts is im p o rtan t.
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age of a technology in period t, relative to the newest technology in th a t period. A 
vintage r  technology in the current period, becomes the vintage r  — 1 technology 
in the next period. Date t output in technology r , is a constant returns to scale 
function of skilled labour ZTj. and unskilled labour Ntj inputs,
iiT,t denotes the number of unskilled agents per skilled agent in vintage r. The as­
sumption of constant returns implies tha t F(0, N ) is linear in N  : define F (0 ,1) =
LJ{) >  0 .
Although newer technologies have higher TFP, older technologies will continue 
to be used if skilled and unskilled labor are complements in production, Fzn  > 0 . 
This crucial assumption introduces a trade-off between adopting new technologies 
with higher TFP, but where skilled labor is scarce, versus the continued use of old 
technologies where skilled labor is abundant but T FP  is low.
Every agent acquires technology specific skills through learning-by-doing in 
youth. All young agents are unskilled. I refer to all unskilled labor as “workers” . 
All old agents are skilled, and may utilize their skills as technology specific “en­
trepreneurs” who hire workers from competitive labour markets to maximize their 
earnings. Let wTj denote the period t earnings of a worker in vintage r. The 
optimal earnings of an entrepreneur in the corresponding vintage is,0
A young worker who enters vintage r  — 1 in period t — 1, earns wT- \ jt- i  in youth 
and becomes skilled in vintage r  in period t. Once old, this agent is free be 
an entrepreneur to earn 7rTtt(wTtt), or exercise the option of being an old worker 
in any other vintage. Assume tha t skilled agents choose to be entrepreneurs
5 Since Fzn >  0 <=> f"(n) < 0, th e  solu tion  to  th e  e n tre p re n e u r’s m ax im ization  problem  is 
unique.
(4)
* T,t(wT,t) =  max7* T f ( n r t) -  nT%twTf (5)
71
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only if they are strictly better off doing so: 7rTt(wTt) > inaxii;S)t. Note that
S
young workers in the frontier technology necessarily produce by themselves to 
earn wqj — 7*^(0,1) =  7 ^ 0  • To summarize, the combination of young and old 
period earnings for a generic agent who is young in period t — 1 is given by,
In each period, agents are distributed across technologies of different ages rel­
ative to the frontier technology. Let /iTt denote the share of old agents in the 
population who are skilled in vintage t , and fj,t the entire distribution. Since pe­
riod t skilled agents in vintage t , were period t — 1 workers in vintage r  — 1, we 
know that p,r _L,_1n r > y T t for Vr > 1.
2.1.3 Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium: in every period (i) each young worker chooses which 
technology specific skill to acquire, how much to earn and consume across periods 
in order to maximize lifetime utility (29) subject to the interest factor R, and the 
constraints (2), (3) and (6); (ii) old agents maximize their earnings and (iii) the 
labor markets for technology specific workers clear.
The indirect utility of young workers, v ( y \ , y 2 \Q,R)  can be rearranged to ex­
press utility as the product of the present discounted value of earnings, a constant 
, and a fraction,
maxmi,m ax
{yi +  7? 2/2) ^ lf  borrowing constraints do not bind
(y\ +  7^ 2) (1 — 0)2/2t f  borrowing constraints bind
min < 1,2
19
This separates out the effects on utility of (i) the level of present discounted 
earnings and (ii) borrowing constraints and the steepness of the earnings profile. 
Let 5 ( R —\ Oj £ (0,1] denote the “lifetime earnings discount factor” . 5 I r —\9
3/2 )  v ' J °  \  3/2
is equal to 1 only if borrowing constraints do not bind, is increasing in the level 
of borrowing constraint 6, | |  > 0 , and is increasing in the ratio of earnings 
p p  > 0. The cross partial, d^ d9 < 0 captures the fact tha t the indifference curves
V2 y2
of agents who face different 6 will be single crossing in the space of young and old 
period earnings.
This characterization of indirect utility will assist the analysis of equilibrium 
outcomes throughout the paper. Using (6), denote the “lifetime earnings discount 
factor” for the generic agent who is young in period t — 1 as,
R ,  = Sr., ( R  f V'T~U,~1--------- r ;0 J (8)
y max <.nTtt(wTtt), maxicSji|  J
Since ex ante identical young workers are utility maximizers, the earnings path 
for each vintage with positive entry by young agents must yield an indirect utility 
at least as high as any other vintage,
max 17TTi,(wTjt), maxics i | ^  8Tit (9)
> max 1 7 maxu/S)i| ^  5Vit
for all t , v such that n T_ 1 > 0.
I restrict analysis to th a t of stationary competitive equilibrium. Such an equi­
librium is a collection of earnings profiles wTit, itTt {wT;t)\ input demands nT)t; 
distribution functions jit such that,
(i) The distribution of agents across vintages is stationary nT t = /ir , 
input demands are stationary n T f — nT, and earnings profiles grow 
at a constant rate wTX — 7 trwT, 1TT:t(wTtt) — 7 ^ T(wT).
(ii) Young workers are indifferent among vintages they enter into (9),
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and old agents maximize their earnings.
(iii) The full employment condition is satisfied: /V =  I -6
A stationary equilibrium is characterized by an invariant distribution of agents 
relative to a constantly changing frontier technology. Although earnings levels 
are growing at a constant rate, the “lifetime earnings discount factors” across 
vintages are stationary since they are functions of the ratio of young and old 
period earnings. The restriction to stationary outcomes means tha t time indices 
will be dropped throughout the rest of the paper.
P rop osition  1 A unique stationary competitive equilibrium exists where,
(i) the terminal vintage is finite T  < oo
(ii) skilled agents m  vintages 1 to T  — 1 are entrepreneurs,
so p,T = 7iT_1/iT_1; young workers who enter vintage T  — 1 remain
workers in vintage T  — 1 when old, so gT = nr2~1 P'T-i
(iii) worker wages are increasing in vintage wT+\ > wT, so nT+1 < n T
(iv) the lifetime earnings discount factor is increasing in vintage 5T+\ > 6T
Proof in Appendix.
When faced with a given worker wage, entrepreneurs in older vintages are 
less productive. Young workers are compensated to enter older vintages through 
higher worker wages. This in turn ensures tha t entrepreneur earnings are falling 
in vintage. Eventually, the worker wage which would warrant entry into a very old 
vintage (vintage T) exceeds the optimized entrepreneur earnings of tha t vintage 
such tha t that vintage and older vintages are not used in production. The slope of 
the lifetime earnings profile is steeper for those who enter younger vintages. Since 
ST is falling in the steepness of the lifetime earnings profile, the present discounted 
value of lifetime earnings is falling in vintage.7
() In s ta tio n a ry  s ta te s , th is  ensures th a t th e  full em ploym ent co n stra in t of young  w orkers is 
au to m a tica lly  satisfied.
7 T h o m p so n  (1999) te s ts  w hether earn ings profiles are  s teep e r in new er technologies using 
h is to rica l d a ta  from  th e  C an ad ian  M aritim e H isto ry  A rchive. He investiga tes th e  v a ria tion  in 
wages across th ree  vessel technologies (s team , barques an d  riggers) an d  finds s tro n g  su p p o rt for 
th is  p red ic tion .
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In equilibrium, the indifference condition across coexisting vintages is given by,
( U° +  R 7ri W^l )^ 5l ~  (^ i  +  ^ 2 (^ 2 ))  $2 =  ••• (10)
=  (wT_i +  ^ W T - i j  5t
Young workers who enter the frontier technology necessarily produce by themselves 
so earn w0 = ljq.
The highest worker wage in the economy is strictly lower than the entrepreneur 
earnings of the penultimate technology, and weakly higher than the entrepreneur 
earnings of the terminal technology. Thus, u >t ~  1 serves as an index of the number 
of vintages in use in the economy,
7T7--i(u>7-_i) > LU'f-l > TTri^r-l)  (11)
Inequalities (10) and (11) are used to iteratively solve for T  and the T  — 1 worker 
wages. The implied input demands across vintages, (ii) from Proposition 1 and 
the full employment constraint are combined to solve for /.q first, and then the 
density of old agents across older vintages.
For vintages 1 to T  — 2, Proposition 1 (ii) says th a t the growth factor of skilled 
agent density is exactly given by the input demands n r , while for vintage T  — 1, 
this growth factor is given by half the input demand. Since input demands are 
falling in vintage, there exists a vintage 5, such th a t nT < 1 for all Vr > S. 
Combining this with (ii) from Proposition 1 implies th a t the density function of 
skilled agents across vintages is single peaked at technology S. The vintage with 
peak density is one way to think about the rate of technology diffusion: the time 
elapsed between the introduction and peak usage of a technology. I adopt this 
definition of diffusion throughout.
When a technology is introduced, it is first learned by young workers producing
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alone. As the technology ages, the supply of entrepreneurs per worker increases 
such that workers can exploit the complementarities in skilled and 
unskilled labor to a greater extent. The process through which as a technology 
ages, workers can earn progressively higher wages while learning a given set of 
skills, will define the process of technology “standardization” in this paper.
2.1.4 D ifferences in borrow ing constraints
This section performs comparative statics by varying the degree of borrowing 
constraint 9. Since labor endowments and the level of skills acquired by workers 
are held constant, any aggregate output differences resulting from varying the 
borrowing constraint 9, are T FP  differences empirically. A simple example is used 
to flesh out the main results, then the general result is presented and a discussion 
of implications follows.
Consider an equilibrium economy where T  =  2 , and borrowing constraints 
are binding for voung workers who enter the frontier technology (i.e. Si < 1). 
Participation constraints determine the vintage 1 worker wage, given 9 and R,
+ ^ i M )  <5i + i w' ) s* ( / C e)  (12)
Denote the two earnings paths as "new technology" and "old technology" occupa­
tions. Using the results of Proposition 1 and the full employment constraint, the 
share of skilled agents in technology 2 is equal to half the input demand of skilled 
agents in technology 1,
_ i  . ^ i O i )  ^^ 2 — l Mi — Mi 2 (13)
This solves for the density of skilled agents across the two vintages.
Now suppose tha t relative to this benchmark economy, young workers in an­
other economy face tighter borrowing constraints 9 < 9. All variables relating to 
this second economy are denoted with hats. Since the new technology occupa­
tion has a steeper earnings profile, the marginal disutility of lower 9 is greater for
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this earnings path and | A<5i | > | A <^2 j - Intuitively, new technologies require more 
“investment” in terms of forgone earnings and tighter borrowing constraints raise 
the “costs” of such investments. Indirect utility across occupations can only be 
equalized again if the present discounted value of earnings for the new technology 
occupation increases. The latter can only be achieved through a lower W\ < Wj. 
Ironically, this implies tha t the earnings profile for the new technology occupation 
becomes steeper, and leads to a second round of reductions in 5i, and W\ and so 
on. The second and further rounds of effects are necessitated by the fact th a t the 
worker wage for the newest technology is anchored at a technologically determined
U3q.
From (13), multiplied reductions in w\, and the implied increase in input de­
mand rqfu 'i), translate into a shift in the distribution of skilled agents away from 
the new technology occupation, p l < fil . Since vintage 1 worker wages are lower, 
the terminal vintage conditions for T  = 2 in (11) may no longer be satisfied (i.e. 
~2(F’j ) > u,'i). It may now be worthwhile for technology 2 skilled agents to be 
entrepreneurs. In this case, the number of coexisting vintages in the economy will 
expand, T  > T. These insights are generalized in the following Proposition: 
P rop osition  2 Compare two economies with different borrowing 
constraints 9 < 9, where < 1, then,
(i) wT < wT, nT(wT) > nT(wT) for all 1 < r  <  T  — 1, and 5T < 5T for all t 
where pT > 0
(ii) the terminal vintage is older in the 9 economy T  > T  
(in) p stochastically dominates
Proof in Appendix.
Recall that the density function for skilled agents across vintages peaks at 
the youngest vintage such tha t nT < 1. Higher input demand within a particular
(14)
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vintage, implies tha t the density function peaks at an older technology in the 0 
economy. Thus, (i) technology diffusion is slower and (ii) a larger range of vintages 
coexist in the economy with tighter borrowing constraints.
D ensity
econom y
econom y
V intage tT
Figure 1: Density of agents across technologies
Consider the youngest vintage Q < T, such tha t fiq > /ig. The stochastic 
dominance result in Proposition 2 (in) means that such a vintage exists. The 
higher input demand within vintages and the higher terminal vintage implies that 
K  > Mr for \JQ  <  t  < T, and /rT < p,r  for VI < r  < Q. [Figure 1] compares 
the density functions of skilled agents across vintages in the 6 economy and 0 
economy. Comparing stationary outcomes in these economies, young workers in 
the 9 economy are born into a higher absolute stock of skills in older vintages 
and a lower absolute stock of skills in new vintages. In this sense, it is more 
“appropriate” for young workers in poorer countries to work in older vintages.8
N T h is  in te rp re ta tio n  has im plications for th e  d eb a te  betw een  tw o a lte rn a tiv e  approaches 
in analyz ing  levels differences in per c ap ita  incom e. T h e  fac to r n e u tra l ch a rac te ris tic  of T F P  
m eans th a t  technologies are  ranked  along a single d im ension, an d  th e re  is a  un ique fron tier 
technology in th e  w orld. An a lte rn a tiv e  approach  first form alized  by A tk inson  an d  S tig litz  
(1969). argues th a t  th e  m enu of technologies exh ib its  different degrees of efficiency bias tow ard  
specific facto rs of p rod u c tio n , so coun tries w ith  different fac to r endow m en ts will choose different 
sets of "ap p ro p ria te  technologies". Caselli and C olem an (2000) find a negative  cross coun try  
co rre la tion  betw een th e  efficiency of uneducated  labo r and  ed u ca ted  labor, an d  p resen t th is  as 
evidence in favor of th e  a p p ro p r ia te  technology approach .
My analysis suggests a way to  reconcile these two approaches. D ifferences in th e  stock  of skills 
across technologies im ply th a t  econom etric  stud ies will d e tec t h igher per w orker p roduc tiv ity
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A number of further differences in steady state outcomes arise. Lower worker 
wages within vintages and an older terminal vintage means th a t the lowest present 
discounted value of lifetime earnings is lower in the 6 economy: w)f_ 1 +  -R&f-i <- 
u'r-1 +  The highest discounted value of lifetime earnings in the 0 economy
is higher: uj{) +  +  ^ 7T](it/']). So more binding borrowing constraints
increase the range of discounted lifetime earnings in the economy. W ithin a par­
ticular vintage, the steepness of the earnings profile is higher in the 9 economy: 
,7T.t{"'t) > jI A i l Given 0 < 6. the implied fall in the lifetime earnings discount
U-’t -  1 H 'r-l r  °
factor, 5t < ST, means the efficiency with which earnings are converted into utility 
is lower in the 6 economy for each vintage.
Since all entrepreneur earnings are higher and the highest worker wage is lower, 
the skill premium within vintages is higher in the 0 economy, nT(wT) — W f_Y > 
7t t ( w t ) — w t - i for Vr < T. Intuitively, when young workers face borrowing con­
straints, the “reward” (skill premium) of “investment” (in terms of foregone earn­
ings) becomes higher when the “cost” of investment rises (tighter borrowing con­
straints). However, the equilibrium effects also lead to higher skill premiums in 
older vintages where young workers do not face borrowing constraints.
Since input demands are lower within each vintage, n T(wT) < n T(wT), it takes 
longer for a particular ratio of entrepreneur per worker to be realized. This implies 
that workers in the 0 economy have to wait longer to command a given level of 
wages while learning a set of skills associated with a particular technology. Thus, 
tighter borrowing constraints slow the rate of technology standardization.
[Figure 2] shows the equilibrium combinations of young and old period earnings
q2 r
of the two economies along their respective indifference curves. Since g%±dd < 0,
V2
differences in borrowing constraints imply tha t these indifference curves are sin-
(for a given m easure of w orkers) in old technologies in p oo r coun tries, an d  h igher per w orker 
p ro d u c tiv ity  in new technologies in rich countries. T h is is th e  case assum ing  econom etric  stud ies 
c an n o t d iffe ren tia te  betw een skilled and  unskilled labo r w hen skills are  acqu ired  th ro u g h  learning- 
by-cloing (th is  is th e  case in Caselli and  C olem an). S uppose ed u ca ted  agen ts  a re  m ore likely to  
work in new technologies th an  u n educa ted  agents. T h en  cross co u n try  re su lts  such as those  of 
Caselli and  C olem an w ould be consisten t w ith th e  underly ing  T F P  ap p ro ach  of m y fram ew ork.
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Figure 2: Earnings combinations across technologies
gle crossing. Suppose these two economies coexisted but there is no international 
worker mobility. Young workers from the 9 economy would prefer to migrate to the 
6 economy to work in older technologies, even when they continue to face borrow­
ing constraint 9 after migration. Meanwhile, young workers from the 6 economy, 
would prefer to migrate to the 6 economy to work in younger vintages. Workers 
in the 0 economy working in a relatively old vintage may observe higher present 
discounted earnings and shallower lifetime earnings profiles in newer vintages in 
the 9 economy.
2.2 In tra -in d u stry  trad e
2.2.1 International labor m obility  as in term ediate goods trade
This section applies the basic model to investigate patterns of specialization across 
technologies which result from international labor mobility. The mobility of all 
factors of production must imply there is factor price equalization. Since there 
are only two factors of production in each vintage (entrepreneurs and workers), 
a sufficient condition for factor price equalization is tha t only entrepreneurs are 
internationally mobile.
27
I interpret outcomes under labor mobility as resulting from trade in inter­
mediate goods in the following way. Consider the earnings of entrepreneurs for 
each vintage as the price of vintage specific intermediate goods tha t they produce. 
Each type of entrepreneur produces one unit of their vintage specific intermediate 
good. W ithin each vintage, the entrepreneur intermediate goods are combined 
with unskilled labor to yield output according to (4). Thus, workers are indiffer­
ent between producing with entrepreneurs and producing with intermediate goods 
produced by entrepreneurs. The analysis is aided by considering outcomes under 
factor mobility, then interpreting these outcomes as arising from intermediate 
goods trade.
Consider two coexisting economies of equal size, economy 9 and economy 6, 
where 9 > 9.'J The interest rate R  is constant. All agents are subject to the borrow­
ing constraints prevailing in their country of origin. Under international mobility 
of labor, there is a “combined economy” populated by two types of workers who 
face different borrowing constraints in youth. Denote by primes all variables re­
lating to outcomes in this combined economy. Let fiw denote the distribution of 
skilled agents across vintages in the combined population. The density of skilled 
agents in vintage t is given by /j}^  — —■ .
A stationary competitive equilibrium with labor mobility is defined as previ­
ously, subject to the following modifications. First, young workers in each economy 
are only indifferent among vintages tha t their compatriots enter into; i.e. for the 
9 economy,
for all t ,  v such that n,T_1 > 0, and similarly for the 9 economy. Second, the full
f) T h ere  is an o th e r in te resting  d im ension arising  from  th e  re la tive  size of th e  tw o econom ies 
which is not exp lored  here.
>
^  max 
1wl/_ht_l +  - m a x
j 7rT]i ( i h y , maxth 
maxu/
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employment constraint is given by: +  At] ~  2. Lemma 1 summarizes the
pattern  of specialization across vintages resulting from labour mobility.
L em m a 1 Let F , jF denote the youngest vintage used by entrepreneurs in 
economy 6 and economy 9. With international labor mobility, 1 = F' < F ' , 
and T' < T ' . I f  borrowing constraints bind for young workers in the 9 economy, 
dp, < 1, then T' G {F ' ,F ' — 1}.
Proof in Appendix.
Both the frontier vintage and the terminal vintage are younger in the 6 econ­
omy. When borrowing constraints are binding for young workers in the 6 economy, 
the technological overlap of skilled agents across the two economies is at most one. 
In equilibrium, the share of agents in the world who migrate to produce with for­
eign agents is not large. Since younger vintages have higher lifetime earnings, 
the level of per capita income is higher in the 9 economy. The sorting across 
vintages is the direct consequence of the single crossing property of indifference 
curves between agents who face different borrowing constraints.
“Technology cycles” , a pattern in which new technologies are first learned ex­
clusively in rich countries and are gradually transferred to poor countries, is an 
equilibrium feature of the analysis. Such cycles are the result of tight borrow­
ing constraint economies delegating the steep earnings profiles activities in the 
world to loose borrowing constraint economies. Under labor mobility, the former 
economies can learn new technologies without having to experience steep earnings 
profiles if they wait until loose constraint economies are in a position to exploit 
the complementarity between skilled and unskilled labor in production. The latter 
allows the 9 economy to adopt new technologies through a earnings path which 
is shallow relative to outcomes without labor mobility. As technologies age, they 
become more standardized as workers can command higher wages while learning 
a given set of skills. Despite an equal access to the technology frontier, agents 
from poor countries wait for technologies to become standardized before adopting 
them from rich countries.
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P rop osition  3 With international labor mobility,
(i) Worker wages within vintages are bounded by the worker wages 
of the two economies under no mobility w T <  w'T <  w T fo r  all r  such 
that n'T >  0.
(n) The terminal vintage in the world, T ' , is bounded by the terminal 
vintage of the two economies under no mobility T  < T ' < T .  The 
terminal vintage of the 9 economy can be older or younger T  f ^ T ' . 
(in) (l stochastically dominates fiw , y)v  stochastically dominates ji,
T = 1 T = 1
Proof in Appendix.
Intuitively, the pattern of technology diffusion and the range of coexisting tech­
nologies used in the combined economy, is bounded by the pattern of technology 
use in the two economies without labor mobility. [Figure 3] plots the distribu­
tion of skilled agents across vintages in each economy under no mobility, together 
with the combined distribution of skilled agents with mobility. Compared to the 
9 economy, the combined economy exhibits slower technology diffusion and older 
terminal vintage. Compared to the 9 economy, the combined economy exhibits 
faster technology diffusion and younger terminal vintage. Thus, the introduction 
labor mobility can never increase the age of the terminal vintage in the world.
A clear prediction emerges with respect to the poor 9 economy. Before la­
bor mobility, the support of the distribution of skilled agents across vintages is 
{ l.T } . After labor mobility this support is { T ' ,T ' } .  Labor mobility causes the 
tight borrowing constraint economy to discard the oldest and newest vintage tech­
nologies and specialize in intermediate vintage technologies. For the 9 economy, 
the terminal vintage can increase or decrease following trade, T  ^  T ' .
The impact of labor mobility on the relative per capita output between the 
two economies depends on the difference in their borrowing constraints. Consider
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Figure 3: Density of skilled agents under international labor mobility
epsilon differences in borrowing constraints between the two economies: 9 = 9 — e. 
This corresponds to the case where all three curves in [Figure 3] merge into one 
curve. Labor mobility is associated with negligible changes in worker wages but 
large changes in the distribution of agents across technologies. 9 economy agents 
are sorted into high earnings new technologies and 9 economy agents are sorted 
into low earnings old technologies. The ratio of per capita incomes across the 
two economies, must increase. Given much larger differences in borrowing 
constraints 9 «  9, the sorting of agents across technologies is accompanied by 
large efficiency gains in the level of world output. This introduces the possibility 
of higher TFP observed in the 9 economy. Overall, this may also imply that 
the ratio of per capita income differences is lower with labor mobility: TFP 
convergence.
[Figure 4] shows the combination of young and old period earnings of agents 
from both economies under labor mobility. These combinations are mapped along 
the lower envelope of the indifference curves of agents from the two economies. 
Agents from both economies must be on higher indifference curves as a result of 
labor mobility. In the 9 economy w[ < Wi ensures lifetime utility is higher for 
young workers entering the frontier vintage. In the 9 economy, > W f_1
ensures lifetime utility is higher for young workers entering the penultimate vin-
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tage. Since participation constraints require lifetime utility to be the same within 
economies, steady state outcomes with labor mobility increases the lifetime utility 
of everyone in the combined economy.
Old earnings
econom y
econom y
Young earnings
Figure 4: Earnings combinations with international labor mobility
Recall tha t if workers are indifferent between working with entrepreneurs and 
working with intermediate goods produced by entrepreneurs, then outcomes under 
international labor mobility are interpreted as outcomes under trade in interme­
diate goods. Since a variety of such intermediate goods associated with different 
technologies, and rankable by their TFP levels, are traded, there is trade in verti­
cally differentiated intermediate goods. Such trade is associated with two forces. 
First, poor countries specialize in older technologies for which they have a com­
parative advantage. Second, trade gives workers in poor countries access to a 
relative abundance of skills in newer technologies which complement the use of 
new technologies. The combination of these two forces, causes poor countries to 
specialize in intermediate vintage technologies relative to before trade.
Through trading with richer, loose borrowing constraint countries, workers in 
poor countries can command higher wages while learning a given set of technology 
specific skills: th a t is, they gain access to a faster rate of technology standardiza­
tion. Although poor countries specialize in the old technologies of the combined 
economy, the efficiency gains resulting from delegating high T FP  activities to rich
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countries can result in the overall TFP of poor countries rising as a result of in­
termediate goods trade. Finally, note tha t the volume of trade in intermediate 
goods is not large. In particular, from Lemma 1, when borrowing constraints bind 
for young workers in the 6 economy, the number of vintages of intermediate goods 
traded is at most two.
2.2.2 Final goods trade
Here I do not allow for international labor mobility (or intermediate goods trade), 
and see what happens when economies differentiated by borrowing constraints 
trade in vertically differentiated final goods. I begin by showing how the model 
accommodates vertically differentiated final goods and perform comparative sta­
tics with the level of borrowing constraint. Then the implications of trade in 
vertically differentiated final goods are analyzed.
Technology specific goods are now differentiated by quality which is defined in 
terms of Lancasterian characteristics. The quality of goods is indexed by 2 > 0, 
and there is a continuum of characteristics indexed by £ > 0. Each unit of good z 
provides one unit of the characteristics £ 6 [0, z]. Following Stokey (1991), house­
hold preferences are additively separable and symmetric across characteristics. In 
period t, the utility derived from an allocation of goods, of measure qt (z) over 
qualities, is given by,
where v is strictly increasing, strictly concave and i>(0) =  0.1() I assume preferences 
are homothetic across goods.
I now interpret new technologies as introducing new goods, where the quality 
index of the frontier good increases by a factor 7 in each period. Let xT denote the 
steady state measure of goods produced using vintage r  technologies, the quality 
index of which increases by a factor 7 each period. The quality z =  1 good is the 
111 If v is linear, the  analysis collapses to  th a t of th e  hom ogenous o u tp u t econom y.
(17)
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numeraire. Homothetic preferences imply tha t relative prices are functions of the 
aggregate supply of goods of different quality, and independent of the distribution 
of income in the economy. In steady states, the date t relative price of the vintage 
t good is given by y fpT where,
From the concavity of u(-), the ratio >  7 is falling in r  and strictly greater 
than 7 for all r  <  T  — 1.
A considerable aid to the exposition is to redefine worker wages in terms of the 
price of final goods they produce, define pT^ T =  wT for all r  >  1. This implies that 
entrepreneur earnings can be rewritten as, 1rT(pT)wT) = pT7r(i/T): defining worker 
wages in this way allows us to separate out the output price component and worker 
wage component of entrepreneur earnings differences across vintages. Note that 
the input demand within vintages can now be expressed as, n T(wT) =  n (v T). Since 
uj0 defines the output of vintage r = 0 goods produced in the frontier technology 
by workers producing alone, they earn wq =  po^o-
A stationary competitive equilibrium is defined as in the case of the economy 
with homogenous output, subject to some modifications. Now an equilibrium 
consists of a stationary collection of earning profiles pTvT, pT7f(z/T), input demands 
h(vT), distribution function p, and prices pT such tha t (i) young and old agents 
maximize their utility, (ii) the full employment constraint is satisfied, (in) the 
market for goods of each quality clears: xT — pTf ( h ( v T)) for all 0 < r  <  T  — 1.
if 0 <
Equilibrium participation constraints are modified as follows,
(po^o +  ^Pitt(^ i)) 61 =  ( p \ V \  +  ^ P 2tt(^2)) S 2
(  1 -— P t ~ 2 ^ T ~ 2  +  " T _1 71r(^T-l) ) ^T-l
(19)
Given the relationship between prices pT, note tha t as before the steepness of the 
lifetime earnings profile must be falling in vintage. Noting tha t p r - i  = yr=r and 
Pt  =  ■> the conditions on the terminal vintage are modified as follows,
The vintage for which vT-\  falls within this range determines the age of the ter­
minal vintage T.
D ifferences in borrowing constraints I use a simple example to flesh out the 
main mechanisms and then present the general results. Consider an equilibrium 
economy where T  — 2 and borrowing constraints are binding in the economy (i.e.
< 1). Participation constraints determine the vintage 1 worker wage, given <9, 
R, po and p x,
The share of skilled agents in vintage 2 is equal to half the input demand of skilled 
agents in vintage 1,
Two quality differentiated goods are produced, where their market clearing condi­
tions are given by, Xq =  /.qujq and xq =  /.q/(n,(z/1)). The relative prices of quality
(20)
)«52 ( q G )  (21)
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differentiated goods (normalized by 7 *) are given by,
V' (.T0 +  X1) +  (7 ~  l)v' (.Tp) =  (7 - 1  )[v' {Xq) ~  V'jxp +  Zi)]
/U 7 7 / (z0 +  z i)  77;' (z0 +  Xi)
Pi =  t J ElI  =  I and pr =  — for all 1 <  r
(,r„+  .17) 7 Y
Now, relative to this benchmark economy, young workers in another economy
face lower borrowing possibilities as a share of their future income, 6 < 6. Variables
relating to this second economy are denoted with hats. The marginal disutility of 
tighter borrowing constraints is greater for the steeper, new technology earnings 
path. Indirect utility across occupations can only be equalized again if the relative 
discounted value of lifetime earnings for the new technology occupation increases. 
Given po and 77, the latter can only be achieved through a lower £7 < v\.
From (22), the implied increase in input demand n(v  1), translates into a shift 
in the distribution of skilled agents away from the new technology occupation, 
/q < //j . Thus, in the 9 economy the ratio of vintage 0 output over vintage 1 
output falls, • Since vintage 1 worker wages are lower,
the terminal vintage conditions for T  — 2 in (20) may no longer be satisfied (i.e.
P-27f (/> 1) > pi £7 ), in which case, the number of coexisting vintages in the economy
will expand, T  > T. As a further simplification, assume T  = T  — 2. Then, 
equilibrium relative prices of quality differentiated goods in the 9 economy are 
given by,
P o  =  ! +  > Po (24)
77/ (z0 +  Zi)
Pi =  Pi =  — and pT = pT for all 1 < r
1
While tighter borrowing constraints discourage entry into younger vintages, the re­
sulting reallocation of agents across vintages leads to relative price changes which 
encourage entry into younger vintages. These relative price changes dampen the ef­
fect of borrowing constraints on the distribution of agents across vintages. Lemma
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2 summarizes the general results which are analogous to those of Proposition 2.
Lem m a 2 Compare two economies with different borrowing
constraints 9 <  9, where ^  < 1, then,
(i) v T < v T, h {hT) <  h { v T) and ST <  ST fo r  all r  where pT > 0 
(vl)  the terminal vintage is older in the 8 economy T  > T  
(Hi) fi stochastically dominates \x,
s s
y Tfor  VS1 < T  (25)
T =  1 T  =  1
(iv) Comparing the 9 economy and 8 economy, the
ratio of relative prices ^  is strictly falling in vintage until =  pPt Pt— 1
Proof in Appendix.
Im pact o f final goods trade Consider two coexisting economies of equal size, 
economy 9 and economy 9, where 9 > 9. Denote by primes all variables relating to 
outcomes with free trade in vertically differentiated final goods. Under free trade, 
market clearing requires x'T +  x'T = p'Tf{h(v'T)) +  fiTf ( h ( v T)) for all 0 < r. The
modified full employment constraint is +  At] =  2 .
Recall the two example economies from above. Begin by holding the quantity 
of output across differentiated goods constant in both economies. The ratio of 
vintage 0 output over vintage 1 output in the world is bounded by the ratio of 
output of the two economies under autarchy, f2- < xp f xo < The ratio of relative
r  J  ’ X \  I l + X j  X l
prices under trade is also bounded analogously, ^  > y- > Since p\ = p\ =  p-[,
this implies that p 0 >  p'0 > p(}. Consider the implications of these relative price
changes on the participation constraints. In the 9 economy, trade encourages 
further entry into the new technology. In the 9 economy, trade discourages entry 
into the new technology.
To satisfy participation constraints in the 9 economy, rq must rise so v\ > zq. 
The implied decrease in input demand n iy f ) ,  translates into a shift in the dis­
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tribution of agents away from the old technology occupation, fi\ > /q . In the 
0 cc.ununiy, the opposite occurs. To satisfy participation constraints in the 6 
economy, i/l must fall so u\ < iq. The implied increase in input demand ), 
translates into a shift in the distribution of agents away from the new technology 
occupation, fi[ < /q. Intuitively, the steady state relative price differences which 
exist before trade dampen the effect of borrowing constraints on the distribution 
of agents across technologies. Under trade in final goods, such relative price dif­
ferences are equalized. Thus, final goods trade amplifies the effect of borrowing 
constraints on the distribution of agents across vintages.
Proposition 4 summarizes the general results of the effects of vertically differ­
entiated final goods trade on the pattern of specialization across vintages.
P roposition  4 Compare two economies with different binding borrowing con­
straints 0 < 0, before and after trade:
(i) in the 6 economy worker wages in each vintage are higher p'Tv'r >  
j)-i/T. and, the terminal vi.nta.ge is younger T' < T  under trade
(ii) y stochastically dominates y!.
s s
VS < T  (26)
T =  1 T =  1
(m ) m  the 0 economy worker wages m  each vintage are lower p'Tv'T <  
p ThT} and the terminal vintage is older T' > T  under trade 
(iv) ft! stochastically dominates ft ,
s s
f i j o r  VS < t  (27)
r = l  t = 1
Proof in Appendix.
Barriers to trade encourage “excessive” entry into high quality production in 
the 9 economy. Under free trade, the distribution of agents across vintages is 
associated with slower technology diffusion and an older terminal vintage. In the
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6 economy, the opposite is true. Barriers to trade encourage excessive entry into 
relatively low quality production. Under free trade, the distribution of agents 
across vintages is associated with faster technology diffusion and a younger ter­
minal vintage. [Figure 5] summaries changes in the distribution of skilled agents 
across vintages caused by free trade in vertically differentiated final goods.
D en si ty
B econom y: 
A fter trade
0 econom y: 
B efore trade
0 econom y: 
B efore trade
0 econom y: 
A fter trade
Vintage x
Figure 5: Density of skilled agents under final goods trade
The introduction of trade definitely improves steady state welfare in the 6 
economy. Since p/T,_lv'T,_l > p t - \V t - \ , lifetime welfare has increased for young 
workers entering the penultimate vintage. From the participation constraints this 
ensures that welfare has increased throughout the f) economy. In the 0 economy, 
the opposite happens to the worker wage of the penultimate technology, but trade 
may still be associated with higher steady state welfare from the relative price fall 
of high quality products.
2.3  C on clu sion
This paper developed a theory of T FP  differences arising from exogenous dif­
ferences in institutions which enforce external investor rights. In the context of 
technology diffusion, such differences generated many of the stylized facts about 
technologies in poorer countries. Although trade and factor mobility may be a
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force for faster technology adoption and welfare gains, I have shown how some 
forms of international interaction may not lead to T FP  convergence.
Future work should try  to verify the links between episodes of institutional 
reform of external investor rights and accelerated output growth. Institutional 
reforms constitute a fall in the “barriers to technology adoption” in my framework. 
Parente and Prescott (1994) define countries which experienced reductions in such 
barriers as having accelerated growth relative to the U.S. over a sustained period. 
A further round of such event studies should focus on the impact of trade in 
generating the predicted pattern of specialization across technologies in the data. 
In particular, this paper predicts dramatic differences in the use of technologies 
across industries where trade has predominantly occurred in intermediate goods 
versus those in which trade has been dominated by final goods.
One potential application of the theory is in understanding residual inequal­
i ty  dynamics between rich and poor nations and their relation to trade. Large 
increases in residual inequality have been well documented in rich countries since 
the early 1970s.11 An independent role for trade in explaining these dynamics 
has been hindered by three facts: during the period considered (i) job realloca­
tions have occurred within industries as opposed to between industries, (ii) the 
volume of trade has not increased dramatically and (iii) trade is empirically asso­
ciated with increased residual inequality in poor countries as well [Zhu and Trefler 
(2001)]. It is possible to argue tha t the intermediate goods trade considered in 
this paper, can lead to increased residual inequality in rich and poor nations, even 
when the volume of such trade is not large. Recall every agent devotes their youth 
to learning technologies and acquires skills in old age. An equilibrium feature of 
workers in newer technologies is their old period component of lifetime earnings 
is larger. Then, if skill acquisition is stochastic, lifetime inequalities are greater in 
newer technologies. When trade in intermediate goods causes both rich and poor 
countries to use newer technologies overall, this would predict greater residual
11 A cem oglu (2001) provides a review  of th e  re la ted  em pirical and  th eo re tic a l lite ra tu re .
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equality across the world.
2 .4  A p p e n d ix
P ro o f o f P rop osition  1
First show that if /iT =  0 for some T  => fJ,T+i =  0. Suppose fiT =  0, ^ T+1 > 0 => 
w t — > 7 _t+1^o => wt < w t - i - This must imply tha t iTt (wt ) <
7tt+\(w t+i ), but using the definition of ttt(wt ), and noting tha t w t+i > 7 _t_1cjo 
this leads to a contradiction.
Second show that T  — oo leads to a contradiction. Begin by supposing that 
u't > => < n T+i.ST > (*>T+i- Using the definition of ttt(wt ),
and noting tha t wT > ry~TWQ this leads to a contradiction. Next suppose wT < 
wT+] =7> 7rT > 7Tt_(_i ■ < (5r+i ■ Since ttt(wt ) is falling in worker wages and vintage,
the claim is contradicted.
Next show tha t iuT < wT+-[ for all r  with /ir > 0. Let T  be the terminal vintage. 
Suppose w t ~ 2  > wt - i =>■ 7tt (wt) > n r - i iw r - i ) -  Since T  is the terminal vintage, 
maxu>s > 7t t ( w t )  and we have a contradiction. By induction worker wages are
S
increasing in vintage. Since entrepreneur earnings are falling in vintage and worker 
wages, entrepreneur earnings are falling in vintage and the steepness of the lifetime 
earnings profile is falling in vintage. Thus, given borrowing constraints are binding
5t < ST+1.
The existence proof of a unique stationary equilibrium can directly appeal to 
Proposition 2 and the Theorem in Chari and Hopenhayn (1991).
P roof o f P roposition  2
First show that wT > wT. Suppose u)\ < from (10) this implies that 
w-2 < W2 , and by induction wT < wT, all r  < T. Note from (11) T  < T. Since 
II > 0 when <*i < 1, revealed preference implies,
k —
>
5 ^
s ( r
Wq
7771( ^ 1) ’
U J q
77Ti(u!i)’
> 1^0 +  ^.TTlOl)
U J q
'771-1( ^ 1) ’
= k
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and the terminal vintage conditions (11) imply,
8 ( R - , 0 )  > Wt -  i +  —w t- i 8 ( R - , 6  1 =  k
7
K -a(! + )^]<5 ( ^ )  > K-i(i + ^  ) = *
Using these inequalities,
7 (5 R
UJq
77rl O l ) ’
8 R
U J q
V l K ) ’
< k — k < XJJ>'T 1
RT - l  +  tdW T - 1
s  ( U ,  e j  — <y
But, [a,'o 4- ■^ 7T1(u'1)] > \w f_ l + ^ u ’7-._1], and the fact tha t g^ ge < 0 contradicts
V2
the inequality. So w\ > vb\ , and by induction wT > wT for all 1 <  r  <  T  — 1 and 
8t > 8t for all 1 < t  < T, and T > T  from ( 1 1 ) .
Using the relationships between successive densities from Proposition 1 (n), 
the full employment condition can be rearranged to yield the following expression 
for the density of skilled workers in vintage 1,
1 ~  Mi  
Mi
=  ni(w{) +  {ni{wl )n2{w2)} +  ... +
Since T  > T  and nT(wT) < nT(wT) for all t  < T  — 1, /q > /q . Let Q be the 
youngest vintage such tha t jiq > {Iq. Since T  > T, nT(wT) < n T{wT), and /q > /q 
stochastic dominance follows for all S' < Q. It also follows th a t fis > fis  for all
T  >  S  > Q, so Yl's \iT > Y ts  Mr• This implies tha t 1 -  YItZ I Mr > 1 ~ S f= i  Mr* 
which establishes the result.
P roof o f Lem m a 1
By way of contradiction suppose for some vintage 5, < 1 and the following
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two conditions hold,
/  , I (  t  \
, r S - 2  +  ^ S - l K - l ) <55-, = ws-i  +  ^m ax{7rs (^5),u;5_i} 5'c
/ , / /  /  \  
u ' . 5 ' - 2  d -  - ^ T T .S —1 ( ^ . 9 - 1  ) N -i -
1w's-1 +  - m a x { j r s (w's ),w;5_i}
This implies that,
<
™S-2 +  —7T5_ i ( ^ _ i )J (5's_ l -  <$S-l)
™s-i +  ^  max{7rs (u/s ), (5 ' 5  -  5S)
From Proposition 1 \w's _2 +  ^ 7T5_i(tc^_1)] > [vu's-i +  # max{7Ts(w's ), ^ 5_i}] , so
the inequality violates d^ dB < 0 , when borrowing constraints bind. So ['U's_2 +  T
y-2
[Wjs - i  +  i  max{7r s t '^ y .^ s - i} ]  ~6's-
P roof o f P roposition  3
Begin with wT < w'T. Suppose iC] > w\ so under mobility, indirect utility is 
higher if young workers from economy 0 enter the frontier vintage . Participation 
constraints imply that worker wages are lower in older vintages wT > w'T. Since 
workers from the 6 economy enter the terminal technology, (11) implies that the 
indirect utility must be lower for such agents. This is a contradiction. So Wj < w[, 
and by induction wT <w'T. From (11), higher worker wages implies T' <  T.
Next consider w'T < wT. Suppose w[ > w\ so under mobility, indirect utility is 
lower for young workers from economy 6 entering the frontier vintage. Participation 
constraints imply tha t worker wages are higher in older technologies under mobility 
w'T > wT. From (11), the latter implies tha t indirect utility would be higher if young 
workers in the 0 economy enter the terminal technology, and this is a contradiction. 
So w\ >  w\, and by induction w'T > wT. Result (ii) follows from the argument 
tha t the level of the highest worker wages serves as an index of the number of 
coexisting vintages in (11). The proof of stochastic dominance is similar to that
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for Proposition 2.
P roof o f Lem m a 2
Given an equilibrium exists and is unique from the Theorem of Chari and 
Hopenhayn (1991), I verify such an equilibrium satisfies the conditions of the 
Lemma. If relative prices between quality differentiated products are held con­
stant, we know from Proposition 2 that when 6 < 9, n (yv) > n(i/v).The task is to 
prove that this implies > j-  for all 1 < t < T  — 1. From the definition of pT 
and rearranging, we need to show,
« (£ .::< !  * .)
( z : = 0 * .)
>' (EL~o J-.) + h - l)1’' (ELo *.) + ... + 7r ~2- T(7 - IV (EI=o z»)
(eL 1 *.) + h - 1 y  (eL02, s) +...+7T-2~Th -  i y  (Ei=o )^
This is true if,
v' (EEo z.) v'(Z:=o a.) , ^'(eLqL)
«'(EEo^) t', (EEo^)
For any vintage 0 < v < T  — 1,
r ' ( E l = o  - Tp  =  ?|/ ( Al  ( ^ 0  +  / ( f i ( ^ i ) )  +  f L ( v i ) f ( n ( v 2 ) )  +  +  ^ l )  X ••• X ^ ( E - l  ) f ( n ( V y ) ) ) )
v' ( E L u ^ )  l’' (Ml (^o + f ^ { v !)) +  n(z/i)/(n(i/2)) +  +  x ... x
Given n(Tr ) > n(z/r ) the result follows. The proof of stochastic dominance is 
similar to that for Proposition 2.
P ro o f o f P roposition  4
Given an equilibrium exists and is unique from the Theorem of Chari and 
Hopenhayn (1991), I verify such an equilibrium satisfies the conditions of the 
Proposition. We need to show, > Ei=i > Using the proof in Lemma 2, an
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equilibrium with such relationships between prices exists if, n(yv) > 
»(/',.)■
Assuming this latter condition holds, the last step is to verify th a t the implied
proof for the 9 economy. Recall the participation constraints across technologies,
Suppose not such that u'T_l < v t - i  and the indirect utility of agents is lower 
under trade. Since this implies l/,t _2 < v t - 2  and by induction v'T < vT
for all 1 < t < T  — 2. But since ^  this means that indirect utility is higher
under trade for agents entering the frontier technology, which is a contradiction. 
So > v t - i  and by induction v’T > vT for all 1 < r  < T  — 1 and < h{vv)
for all 1 < v < T  — 1. From (20) we also know T '  <  T.
In the 6 economy a similar logic reveals n(vv) > n (vv) for all 1 < v  < T  — 1, 
and T' > T. The proof is completed by observing that n(y'v) >  n(vv) and n(v'v) < 
h (yv) is consistent with what was assumed, n{pv) > > n{yv). The
proofs of stochastic dominance are similar to tha t for Proposition 2.
relationships between prices are consistent this assumed condition. Verifying this 
is sufficient to confirm the claims of the Proposition. I shall work through the
Given for all r  < T  — 1, it must be the case tha t v'T_1 > v t - i -
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3 E ntrepreneurs versus M anagers: S elf E m ploy­
m ent versus O utside O w nership
This chapter develops a theory of entrepreneurs and managers in the context of 
self employment versus outside ownership of productive assets. A focal interest 
is why in capitalist societies, agents who accumulate skills specific to a set of 
disembodied assets are often hired by outside owners of such assets. It is helpful 
to outline the structure of the model before discussing motivation.
Two period lived agents in a general equilibrium economy undertake two pe­
riod projects which combine physical assets with asset specific skills which they 
accumulate when old through learning by doing when young. When agents pro­
ductivity streams are steeper than their desired consumption streams and they 
cannot borrow, outside ownership of physical assets can improve outcomes. Un­
der outside ownership of assets, owners hold up agents with asset specific skills 
and extract part of their product. Since agents anticipate this ex post hold up 
by outside owners, when owners compete to attrac t agents ex ante, they offer up 
front wages in excess of agents’s product. In effect, outside owners implement a 
st,ream of transfers to such agents which resembles borrowing. The difference be­
tween agents’s discounted product and earnings streams constitutes a "dividend" 
determining the value of scarce productive assets under outside ownership. The 
arbitrage opportunity for outside ownership arises because of a correlation in pe­
riods when agents have asset specific skills, and agents’s desire to borrow against 
their labor product from tha t period .12
Agents who produce with outside owners are called "managers". Another 
group of agents called "entrepreneurs" undertake new projects where unlike man­
agers, they cannot commit to acquiring skills specific to  a set of assets. Then
12An im p o rtan t issue is why ou ts ide  ow nership  is d ifferent from  d eb t. U nder s ta n d a rd  deb t 
co n trac ts , c red ito rs  do not own assets un til th ere  is repaym ent defau lt w hich h ap p en s after 
p roduc tion . U nlike ou ts ide  ow nership , th e re  is no ex p o st hold up. D eb t c o n trac ts  are  d iscussed 
la ter.
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there are 110 incentives for outsiders to own assets. Self employed entrepreneurs 
earn their labor product each period, and are borrowing constrained. However, the 
subsequent use of entrepreneurs’s assets in repetitions of projects is the technology 
which allows managers to commit to acquiring skills specific to th a t asset. Thus, 
by undertaking new projects, entrepreneurs create value to new assets correspond­
ing to the surplus implemented under outside ownership in future repetitions of 
the project. The key role of entrepreneurs is to supply the economy with assets 
which outside owners use with hired managers to carry out projects.
An equilibrium where entrepreneurs and managers coexist is constructed by 
assilining all new projects have higher productivity. In this way, I justify why an 
endogenous number of productive and less productive projects coexist, and the 
model can be interpreted as one of gradual technology diffusion. Project lifetimes 
are finite and there is a continuous entry and exit of projects. The full general 
equilibrium economy is also populated by workers who produce with managers and 
entrepreneurs. Workers’s lifetime product profiles are shallower than for managers 
and entrepreneurs, and their savings ensure tha t a t the general equilibrium interest 
rate, entrepreneurs will be borrowing constrained.
The existing literature models entrepreneurs as providing a different set of 
scarce resources. Following Schultz (1975), Holmes and Schmitz (1990) assume 
the ability to exploit arbitrage opportunities is scarce, and is provided by talented 
entrepreneurs. A related Schumpetarian (1934) view assumes innovation activ­
ity is scarce, and entrepreneurs carry out innovations. Following Knight (1921), 
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) assume that risk taking behavior is scarce, and 
entrepreneurs are relatively risk loving.
In contrast to this theoretical literature, entrepreneurs are empirically iden­
tified as (i) the self employed who are (ii) borrowing constrained. Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989) and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) find agents en­
dowed with greater wealth are more likely to become self employed. My theory of 
entrepreneurs begins with a theory of outside ownership which by default implies
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particular outcomes under self employment. A necessary condition for outside 
ownership and self employment to coexist is tha t the self employed are borrowing 
constrained. A theory of entrepreneurship where assets which agents can commit 
to acquire skills specific to are scarce, and new assets are supplied by the self 
employed coincides well with the empirical identification of entrepreneurs.
Another set of necessary conditions for entrepreneurs and managers to coexist 
is the continuous entry and exit of finite lived projects. After re-labeling assets 
under outside ownership as "firms", a reduced form characterization of the model 
coincides exactly with the canonical industry equilibrium model of Hopenhayn 
(1992). In this sense, my theory provides microfoundations for the interpretation 
of "firms" in tha t framework. By opening up the black box of "firms", and explic­
itly considering the ownership structure of assets and mode of production, I can 
provide particular interpretations for the firm entry cost and firm continuation 
cost assumed in Hopenhayn (1992).
Neher (1999) constructs an agency model of stage financing where successive 
stages allow entrepreneurs to disembody more of their human capital in physical 
assets and thereby implement larger loans. My paper considers what happens to 
such assets after the initial project and how they derive value from their future use. 
The idea that the ex post hold up problem in bilateral matches can be alleviated 
through ex ante competition is present in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Kim 
(1999). In a search unemployment framework, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show 
when the capital investment by firms before they are matched with workers yields 
product which is extracted by workers through ex post hold up, the ex ante com­
petition between workers to be matched with greater capital will improve firms’s 
chances of being matched with workers. Kim (1999) shows an analogous result 
when workers invest in general skills before being matched with firms. Both papers 
show tha t as long as the search frictions are associated with no externalities (the 
Hosios condition), there is no investment inefficiency associated with the ex post 
hold up. Cunat (2002) considers a related mechanism in a model of trade credit
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where suppliers and customers form bilateral matches, and suppliers anticipating 
ex post hold up rents from customers, compete for customers by offering ex ante 
payments. The resulting trade credit coexists with normal bank credit despite 
its high premium. The current chapter applies the logic of these models to an 
environment where the combination of ex post hold up and ex ante competition 
actually improves outcomes, to justify outside ownership arrangements.
Sections 2 and 3 describe the model and equilibrium. Section 4 discusses some 
of the implications, and section 5 shows how a reduced form version of the model 
coincides with the Hopenhayn (1992) model. Section 6 concludes.
3.1 M od el
Consider a two period overlapping generations economy with a constant popula­
tion of agents normalized to 2. Ex ante identical agents have preferences over their 
lifetime given by,
u = c ^ c f B 0 < /? < 1 (28)
Young agents cannot commit to repay loans made against their old period 
earnings. Thus, there are no credit markets although there may be asset markets. 
Given their young and old period labor earnings y \ ,y <2 and the interest factor of 
the economy R t , the indirect utility as a function of earnings for a generation born 
in period t can be expressed as,
(yi +  7^ 2) { P R t ) ^
?’(?/i • V2 \ R) —    if borrowing constraints do not bind
1 ~\~ P
1 0
=  y l+0y2 +0 if borrowing constraints bind (29)
3.1.1 Technology
There is an excess supply of two period projects which are indexed by age, or 
vintage t  E {0,1,...}. A t  — 1 project today becomes a r  project tomorrow. In
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every period, frontier projects are introduced whose to tal factor productivity is 
7 > 1 times greater than the total factor productivity of last period’s frontier 
projects.
Agents can enter one of three occupations: workers, entrepreneurs or managers. 
Workers provide unskilled labor in competitive labor markets throughout their life­
times. Entrepreneurs and managers undertake projects according to a LeontiefT 
technology: one entrepreneur or manager per project. Both entrepreneurs and 
managers acquire project-specific skills when old, by undertaking projects when 
young. Period t — 1 young entrepreneurs or managers have no project specific skills, 
and yield a constant marginal product, which is assumed to be identical across 
projects and vintage: y ~ lxV -u -i — 7 f_1.T V r,t. Once old in period £, entrepre­
neurs or managers can combine their project-specific skills with hired workers nT>t, 
to yield,
y T,t =  7 t - V  i n r , t )  7  >  i ;  / '  >  o, /"  < o (30)
Old projects are less productive than new projects. There is no uncertainty in this 
economy.
I assume old, skilled entrepreneurs and managers must work with 1 unit of 
a project and vintage specific physical asset. Project specific skills are also asset 
specific skills. Assets live forever, but project and vintage specific assets cannot 
be reproduced .13 Let VTtt > 0 denote the value of an asset used by a vintage r  
skilled entrepreneur or manager in period t .
W hat differentiates entrepreneurs from managers is the following. Entrepre­
neurs work in "virgin" projects where "raw" assets have to be formed in the first 
period of the project. Raw assets are associated with a commitment problem. 
Young entrepreneurs cannot commit to acquiring skills specific to a particular set 
of raw assets. The verified use of an asset in a virgin project, converts raw assets 
into "seasoned" assets in the second period of a virgin project. Managers work in
i,JT h is  m eans ou ts ide  ow ners m ust use asse ts p reviously  used by an  en trep ren eu r, an d  en tre ­
p reneurs can sell assets to  ap p ro p ria te  th e  gains from  o u ts ide  ow nership .
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"mature" projects where seasoned assets exist in the first period of the project. 
Seasoned assets are not associated with a commitment problem. Young managers 
can commit to acquiring skills specific to a particular set of seasoned assets. I 
simplify the analysis by assuming the raw materials forming assets are in excess 
supply, so the price of raw assets Vo)t =  0 VL14
There can be old, virgin projects, although it will be shown in equilibrium that 
all virgin projects are new. Assuming the latter, the lifetime of a project is shown 
in [Figure 6].
Vintage 0 Vintage 1 Vintage 2
Frontier project Repeated project
Period 2 Period 2
Frontier project U ses raw asset U ses season ed  asset
Period 1 & &
Buy raw a sset Repeated project Repeated project
Period 1 Period 1
Buy season ed  asset Buys sea so n ed  asset
Figure 6 : Lifetime of a project
A period t — 1 new virgin project yields net output Y ~ lx ~  Vo,t- i  — 7 t_1£ , 
plus the skills of the entrepreneur used next period. In period £, the project yields 
output 7 f  (ni.t ) +  V\<t- A vintage r  — 1 >  1 mature project beginning in period 
t — 1 . yields net output plus the skills of the manager used next
period. In period t, the project yields output Y ~ Tf  (nT,t) +  VT,t-
Let wTj  denote period t worker wages in vintage r. Since homogenous work­
ers are hired from competitive labor markets wT t =  wt Vr, workers always earn 
their marginal product. Similarly, young entrepreneurs and managers have no 
asset specific skills so always earn at least their marginal product. Let 7rr (wt) 
denote maximized skilled entrepreneur or manager productivity across projects. 
Skilled productivities and input demands for unskilled workers are strictly falling 
in vintage: tct (wt) > n T+i (wt) ; nT (wt) > n T+1 (wt) . Since old entrepreneurs and
11 In p a rticu la r, th is  a ssum p tion  allows th e  econom y to  avoid ou tcom es w here new  an d  old
p ro jec ts  coexist because th e  raw  m ateria l costs of old assets have a lread y  been sunk.
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managers are free to provide unskilled labor, we must have ttt (wt) > wt > rfx.  
Entrepreneur and manager productivity profiles are steeper than for workers. Out­
side the project, the best option for an entrepreneur or manager is to become a 
worker.
Let //,T, denote the period t measure of old entrepreneurs and managers in 
vintage r , and eTyt the period t measure of old entrepreneurs only in vintage r.
3.1.2 Self E m ploym ent and O utside O w nership
[Figure 7] shows the timing of events in each period. Agents produce, then conduct 
asset transactions, and finally consume.
A s se t
tran saction s
1
1
Production
1 1 
C onsum ption
Figure 7: Timeline in period t
I begin with a discussion of managers then consider outcomes for entrepreneurs. 
If an old manager owns the seasoned asset he produces with, he earns the full 
product of his asset specific skills plus the resale value of the asset. If outsiders own 
seasoned assets, the asset owner and manager must bargain over the division of a 
surplus consisting of the manager’s product minus his earnings outside the project: 
unskilled worker wages. Bargaining takes place before production. I assume that 
outside owners have full bargaining power such tha t managers’s earnings can be 
driven down to their outside options when outsiders own assets. This hold up 
under outside ownership arises because agents cannot contract upon the level 
of output within projects and the level of asset specific skills of managers. Since 
managers anticipate second period earnings equal to unskilled wages, under outside 
ownership, young managers must be offered earnings at least equal to unskilled
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wages to participate in this occupation. In sum, young managers earnings would 
exceed their product wt > x, while old managers would earn less than  their product
W t <  7Tt ( W t )  . l 0 l G
Let R t- i  denote the period t — 1 (implicit) general equilibrium interest factor 
in the asset market. Consider an outside owner who buys a seasoned asset for 
VT_l and hires a young manager in period t — 1 who realizes output Y ~ lx  f°r 
wage wt_}. In period t, the owner bargains over the output to receive a surplus 
7rT (wt) — wt and then sells the asset for VTjt. Assuming competitive markets for 
outside ownership, and positive asset values, the net discounted earnings of outside 
owners must be zero,
of the difference between the net discounted productivities and earnings of man­
agers. For r  — 1 > 1.
ownership up to a finite number of vintages.
In multi period projects, the correlation between periods when agents have 
asset specific skills, and agents wish to borrow against product from tha t period 
in borrowing constrained economies, implies there are arbitrage opportunities for 
other agents who can implement loans for such agents. Since outside owners of
if‘An a lte rn a tiv e  in te rp re ta tio n  coincides w ith th e  analysis of firm  specific skills in Becker 
(1964). O u tside  asse t ow ners ap p ro p ria te  th e  gains from  asset specific skills an d  "invest" (wt — x) 
in young m anagers.
1()D uring  th e ir  jo b  tenure , m an ag e rs’s p ro d u c t profiles are  s teep e r th a n  th e ir  ea rn ings profiles. 
T h is  analysis is inconsisten t w ith  sen iority  wages: th e  phenom enon  th a t  d u rin g  jo b  tenu re , wage 
profiles are  s teep e r th a n  p ro d u c t profiles. W hile em pirica l stud ies have show n m easu red  o u tp u t is 
consisten t w ith  sen io rity  wages, u nm easu red  com ponen ts of o u tp u t (such as th e  tra in in g  provided 
to  young bv old) m ay im ply th a t sen iority  wages does no t hold.
nT (wt) -  wt + VT>t) =  0 for T  -  1 >  1 (31)
Rearranging yields an equation for the evolution of seasoned asset values in terms
max < 0= 
I verify below in equilibrium tha t seasoned assets have positive value under outside
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seasoned assets carry out cash flows to managers th a t resemble loans, seasoned 
assets can have positive value when they are scarce.17
Now consider entrepreneurs. Since young entrepreneurs cannot commit to 
acquiring skills particular to a set of assets, outside owners have no incentive to 
own raw assets which have value Vo =  0- Thus, entrepreneurs earn their product 
when young and old. Upon completion of a virgin project, entrepreneurs own the 
new seasoned assets which have value Vjif >  0 .
3.2  E q u ilib riu m
A competitive equilibrium requires in every period (i) an ownership structure of 
assets and (ii) agents’s choice of occupation, vintage and consumption to maximize 
lifetime utility subject to the borrowing constraint, earnings across occupations 
and vintage, the (implicit) interest factor, asset market clearing condition and la­
bor market clearing condition. I restrict attention to steady state growth outcomes 
where earnings levels, assets prices grow at a constant rate 7 , and the distribu­
tion of labor across occupations, interest factor and ownership structure of assets 
are invariant across time: wt = 7 ^ ,  ttt (wt) = 7 tn T (w) , K-,t — 7 4K-, hT,t ~  A ) 
e T ,< —  67-,  Rt —  R.
Ex ante identical agents become entrepreneurs, managers and workers if their 
lifetime utility across occupations and vintage is equalized18,
v 7*1/T +  7*717 (w) ; R) — v (7 *_1ic, 7 *1/;; R ) Vr where eT > 0 (33)
Note in terms of labor earnings, managers are identical to workers. This comes
1 ‘ Skills iimy be general w ith respect to many assets, bu t m erging such asse ts can m ake skills
cle facto specific. T hen , a lthough  th e  technology is co n stan t re tu rn s  to  scale in asse ts , en trep re ­
n eu rs /m an a g e rs  and  w orkers, th e re  are increasing  re tu rn s  to  m erging p ro jec ts  w here m an ag e rs’s 
skills are  general. T his argum en t unravels if skills are general th ro u g h o u t all p ro jec ts  in th e  
economy. T h e  single m erged asset would im plem ent th e  ex p o st hold up  of m anagers, b u t no t 
th e  ex an te  co m p etitio n  to  a t t r a c t  m anagers. B o th  th e  ex p ost hold up  an d  ex a n te  com petition  
are  essen tia l for ju s tify in g  th e  a rb itra g e  role of ou ts ide  ow nership .
18T he use of C obb  D ouglas preferences ensures th a t  no rm alizing  ea rn ings by 7 * does not affect 
th e  p a rtic ip a tio n  co n stra in ts .
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from the assumption th a t outside owners have full bargaining power.19 I guess that
entrepreneurs must be borrowing constrained and verify this below in Lemma 2.
Since older projects are less productive, entrepreneurs will only enter frontier 
projects to become skilled in a r  =  1 project when old. Since managers have to 
wait for entrepreneurs to supply seasoned assets, the youngest vintage they can 
enter is r  =  1 to become skilled in r  =  2. So =  e^and er =  0 Vr > 1.
Young entrepreneurs entering r  =  0 in period t — 1 produce nft~1x  then form 
raw assets for free and consume their output. Once old in period t they produce 
7 ^ 1  (v>) and sell seasoned assets for yV i and consume. Although entrepreneurs 
consume their net labor earnings, young managers and workers may also carry 
out asset purchases when young which constitutes the savings technology of the 
economy.
Let T  > 1  denote the oldest or terminal vintage such that,
For younger vintages this inequality holds strictly, and for older vintages the in­
equality is reversed. Skilled agents coexist in vintages 1 to T. Since older projects 
are less productive, T  is finite and a decreasing function of w and R. The steady 
state supply of entrepreneurs determines the number of assets and managers in 
each surviving vintage, so skilled agent densities across coexisting vintages are 
uniform, P ]  - //.r =  // VI < t  < T.
Solving recursively, the steady state value of a vintage r  — 1 seasoned asset can 
be expressed as a function of the difference in discounted lifetime productivities 
of managers and workers given R :
(34)
f o r  1 <  r  — 1 < 1
= 0 f o r  t  > T  — 1
19 M anagers an d  w orkers are  d is tingu ished  by th e  ten u re  of em ploym ent for asse t ow ners. Tw o 
periods for m anagers, one period  for workers.
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The difference between discounted lifetime productivities between managers and 
workers is the dividend earned by the seasoned assets under outside ownership. 
The right hand side of the equation represents the asset value of the flow of div­
idends. Asset values are strictly falling in vintage t ,  the worker wage 7tw, and 
the interest factor R , and increasing in the age of the terminal vintage T.  If man­
agers coexist in the economy, > 0 => y ~ lx +  ^ 7 ^ 1  (w) > 7 t~lw T ^ 7*uc
Given the participation constraint, entrepreneurs can only have higher discounted 
earnings if they are borrowing constrained.
Given V\(w, Rf.  the indifference condition between entrepreneurs and workers 
allows us to solve for the equilibrium worker wage as a function of the interest 
factor, w* — w(R).
Lem m a 1 Worker wages are falling in the interest factor ^  <  0.
P ro o f. The indifference condition is,
_j_ x 3 w  ( l +  -57 )  (PR) 1^
X W  (7 Vi(w,R)  + 77T! O ) ) ^  =  —^ ----------
Since V\ is strictly falling in R , entrepreneurs’s utility is (weakly) falling in R. 
Workers’s utility is (weakly) rising in R  as long as (/3 — -^) > 0. This inequality 
must hold under asset market clearing in Lemma 2, so the result follows. ■
The labor market clearing condition for old agents is given by,
r
^  =  1 -  gT  (36)
T  =  1
Only half of the steady state measure of workers are old. Since T  and nT are 
falling in w, g  overall is increasing in w.
Using the steady state measures of gT and ei, the asset market clearing condi­
tion is given by,
7 V (T  -  1) *  P [w — x)
T  -  1 v ;
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This gives us the equilibrium interest factor as a function of the unskilled wage 
R* =  R(w).2[) The left hand side denotes the demand of aggregate savings con­
sisting of seasoned asset values and the ex ante "loan" to young managers. The 
right hand side denotes the supply of aggregate savings offered by managers and 
workers at interest factor R  in competitive asset markets. Note when there are 
no managers, T  = 1, then the left hand side is zero and the equilibrium interest 
factor is
L em m a 2 Entrepreneurs must be borrowing constrained given any interest 
factor clearing the asset market. The interest factor lies between ^ < R* <
8  x
P ro o f. Suppose not so R* > ^ 77r?J ^ - and (x +  (w)) — (w +  ^ 7 ^ )  =  0 =>
T  = 1, no assets are traded, and pi2 = 0 Vr >  2 there are no managers. Since 
there are no asset market transactions the equilibrium interest factor is R* = 
This is a contradiction. The bounds on the interest factor follow by inspection. ■
Workers play a crucial role in ensuring th a t at the general equilibrium interest 
factor, entrepreneurs and managers may coexist since entrepreneurs are borrowing 
constrained. The asset market clearing condition can be rewritten in terms of 
equating the net demand for savings by managers to the supply of savings by 
workers alone,
E7.C-, ( w . R )  (l + a) 
T  -  1 1+/ 3
w — x i , x — V) w =  y ( i
Suppose workers are excluded from buying seasoned assets so the right hand side 
equals zero. Managers would be buying assets in each others projects, and the 
equilibrium interest factor would cause managers to consume at most x  when 
young. Since entrepreneurs can consume x  when young and entrepreneurs have 
higher discounted lifetime income than managers, entrepreneurs and managers
’An a lte rn a tiv e  fo rm ula tion  of th e  asset m arket c learing  cond ition  is asse ts  a re  p riced  by th e ir  
d iscoun ted  fu tu re  resale price and  d iv idend , ^  X lr=2  Wt iw iR)  +  W t (w ) — iu)] . T h e  defin ition  
of asset values ensures th e  equivalence of th e  tw o form ulations.
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would not coexist among ex ante identical agents.
P ro p o s itio n  1 A steady state equilibrium {re*, R*,T*, /i*} exists for the econ­
omy.
P ro o f. Consider the bounds on w* given the bounds on the interest factor from 
Lemma 2. The upper bound is given by w = w . The lower bound is given 
by w e e  w ( ^ 77r]X(w)) ’ an<^  ^  known that entrepreneurs are not borrowing con­
strained, Vi = 0. So, w* G (w,u)].
From Lemma 2. we know R*{\y) G .'3— r ) and R*(w) G-.7Ti Wl / ' 723 ' , r,(\y) 2  R x3  ’ ■ 7 7 T ! ( w )
Consider the following two cases. Case 1: T  =  1 => R*(w) =  Case 2:
T  (^ w. ^  > 1 => R*(w) > J and R*(w) > fr  Under case 1, the economy has a 
solution where w* =  w, and R* — Under case 2, the economy has a solution 
where w* G  ( w , w ) ,  and R* G  • ■
3.3  D iscu ssio n
3.3.1 C o ex is ten ce  o f E n tre p re n e u rs  a n d  M an ag e rs
This subsection highlights three necessary assumptions for entrepreneurs and man­
agers to coexist. First, if there are no borrowing constraints and young agents can 
freely borrow against their old period earnings, only frontier projects would be un­
dertaken and there would be no managers, T' = 1. The present discounted value 
of earnings would be equal for entrepreneurs and workers. In such an economy 
the credit market clearing condition would be,
m
Substituting in equilibrium jj! this equation becomes,
(V  - x )  ( P -  % ) w'
(39)
Similarly, if there were borrowing constraints, but young entrepreneurs could
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commit to acquire skills specific to raw assets, only frontier projects would be 
undertaken and the present discounted value of earnings would be equal for man­
agers and workers. In such an economy the asset market clearing condition would 
be identical to the credit market clearing condition above since the price of raw 
assets used in virgin projects is zero.
More generally, since positively valued assets substitute for the market failures 
in the credit and asset markets, asset values would be inversely related to the 
degree of either of these imperfections.
A third necessary condition is that project productivities increase over time, 
7  > 1. Consider outcomes in the limit as 7  —> 1. From the definition of T, 7  —> 
1 => (i) T  —> 00 => /u —> 0, (ii) asset values converge to a constant independent of 
t  : VT —> V(w, R) =  +  ^ 7 r (w)J — , and ( Hi )  input demands
for workers are independent of r  : nT(w) —» ri\(w). The asset market clearing 
condition at the limit is,
V (w t R) + (w -  x) \P
Mw)  j l +  fl
2
Agents in equilibrium are indifferent across occupations, but since assets live for­
ever, nobody becomes an entrepreneur. For entrepreneurs and managers to coexist 
~ 1 must hold, for there to be a, continuous entry and exit of finite lived projects.
3.3.2 D ebt C ontracts
Direct credit markets were shut down in the previous analysis. A substitute savings 
technology was provided in the form of an asset market. Although managers and 
workers lend in asset markets, entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained in equilib­
rium. In reality, entrepreneurs may be able to borrow against the anticipated value 
of seasoned assets they own and sell after virgin projects are completed. A typical 
debt contract consisting of a loan and repayment plan which confers ownership 
rights on all physical assets of entrepreneurs to creditors if entrepreneurs default
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on repayments could be implemented. Debt repayments take place after produc­
tion and before asset transactions. Since entrepreneurs can only borrow against a 
positive asset value V\ > 0 , and seasoned assets can only have value under outside 
ownership, the qualitative results discussed above would not be affected.
Once debt contracts collateralized by seasoned assets are allowed, the partici­
pation constraint across occupations becomes,
V ( T + ^ 7Fl = V W' ^
Since project productivities fall with age, and managers are at least as well off as 
entrepreneurs, managers continue to strictly prefer being hired by outside owners, 
rather than using debt contracts to own assets themselves.
My model predicts tha t over the life-cycle of a project, external finance would 
first be provided using debt, and then outside ownership or "equity". Unlike 
outside owners, debt creditors cannot hold up skilled managers since their owner­
ship of assets occurs after production, conditional on default on repayment. The 
Modigliani-Miller proposition does not hold here, since seasoned assets can only 
yield dividends under outside ownership. However, when the gains from outside 
ownership is not feasible in virgin projects, debt contracts would be written against 
the anticipated value of assets under outside ownership.21
3.3.3 O ptim al Term inal V intage
Is the terminal vintage rule efficient? Efficiency is ensured by a terminal vintage 
rule which equates the discounted value of a continued project (the manager prod­
uct) to the discounted opportunity cost (the product of the manager if he was a 
worker).22
21 O u tside  ow ners can borrow  up  to  th e  resale value of assets as well. In  th e  cu rren t m odel, 
since all lenders are  hom ogenous, ou ts ide  ow ners are  ind ifferen t be tw een  th e  m ix  of d eb t and  
equ ity  up  to  th e  resale value of th e  asset.
12T h e  two d iscoun ted  values m ay not hold w ith  exact equality  since th e  sequence of p ro jec t 
d ep rec ia tions is d iscrete .
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The main analysis assumed that outside owners have full bargaining power 
such that skilled managers’s labor earnings are driven down to their outside option: 
worker wages 7 lw. Suppose when bargaining with outside owners, managers can 
secure a share 0 < 9 < 1 of the surplus between his product and outside option. I 
interpret 9 as an exogenous institutional variable which individual agents cannot 
affect. Let 7 f£7r _ 1 > r fx  denote the earnings offered by outside owners to attract 
young managers who will become skilled in a vintage r  project when old. The 
new terminal vintage rule sets T  > 1 as the oldest vintage such that,
( ?; +  f t 71"7’ ~  ( ^ r “ 1 + ~r \6 ~ w^ +wl) ^  0  (4 2 )
As long as managers remain borrowing unconstrained, they are willing to work 
for discounted labor earnings equal to tha t of workers. If they are borrowing 
constrained, their discounted labour earnings must be higher for them to remain 
indifferent, across occupations.
7
zut- i — w — ^[9  ( ttt (w ) ~  w)] if borrowing unconstrained (43) R
7
> w — — [9 (ttt {w ) — tc)] if borrowing constrained R
As long as managers are not borrowing constrained (low 9), the terminal vin­
tage rule is optimal. Once they are borrowing constrained (high 9), the terminal 
vintage is lower than the optimum. Suppose for instance 9 = 1, then T  =  1, no
assets are traded and there are no managers.
An interpretation of this result is that in economies where outside owners’s 
rights are well protected (low 9), no other stakeholder interests need to be pro­
tected. In economies where outside owners’s interests are poorly protected (high
9), other stakeholder (e.g. managers’s) interests need to be considered in the 
decision to term inate projects.
High 9 economies are characterized by a relative scarcity of employment vacan­
cies opened by outside owners. They are also characterized by a relative abundance
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of self employed entrepreneurs who undertake relatively short lived projects.
3 .4  F irm s as A sse ts  U n d er  O u tsid e  O w n ersh ip
This section sets up a canonical model of industry equilibrium and interprets it as 
a reduced form version of my model. Consider a discrete time economy composed 
of a continuum of "firms" which produce a homogenous good. The output of an 
individual firm which is r  > 1 periods old in period t is,
n/T i > 1 denotes the quantity of labor hired from competitive labor markets at 
wage wt. If m Ttt ^  1 output is zero. In each period, a fixed cost y£c must be
opened at fixed entry cost y£F, and yield no output until they are 1 period old. 
In a steady state growth equilibrium,, the life of a firm is prolonged as long as,
Let T  denote the terminal age of firms, and R  the discount factor of the economy.
The value of a 1 < t < T  period old firm is given by,
This economy almost exactly describes the industry equilibrium of Hopenhayn 
(1992). The only differences are tha t (i) new firms do not yield output until they 
are 1 period old, (ii) incumbent firms incur fixed costs to keep firms open in the
71 r /(" ir ,t -  1) 7  > 1; / '  > 0 , f "  <  0 (44)
incurred to prolong the life of the firm by 1 period. New 0 period old firms are
c + ^ [ l  Tf ( m T ~  1) — m Tw’] > 0 (45)
New firms will enter until discounted profits net of the entry cost is zero. In 
equilibrium.
f - - c + 4 g (47)
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following period as opposed to the current period, and (m ) one extra worker must 
be hired in production.
Recall the original economy with entrepreneurs, managers and workers. Let 
(z) m T = n T +  1, (zz) c = w — x, and (zzz) F  =  [x +  ^  [zri ( w )  +  Vi]) — (w +  %w) 
the difference in discounted earnings which compensates entrepreneurs for facing 
borrowing constraints. Assuming managers have no bargaining power 0 — 0, they 
are identical to workers in terms of earnings. Then, a reduced form version of 
my original economy has been exactly described above when assets under outside 
ownership are called "firms".
Substituting in for c and mT and rearranging, firm values and asset values are 
equated by,
Gt = (nT (w) — w) + VT for 1 < r  < T  (48)
The value of a firm coincides exactly with the dividend and resale value of seasoned 
assets under outside ownership. These substitutions also ensure tha t the terminal 
vintage condition is identical for both economies.
In light of my theory, the assumptions underlying the canonical Hopenhayn 
(1992) model can be interpreted in the following way. "Firms" undergo changes in 
their ownership structure during their life-cycle from self employment to outside 
ownership. Under self employment, borrowing constrained owners need to be com­
pensated to open new firms, and this compensation translates into the fixed entry 
cost F  in the Hopenhayn (1992) model. Since the role of the self employed is to 
supply the economy with seasoned assets, their compensation for facing borrowing 
constraints can be interpreted as the entry cost for seasoned assets. The "loan" 
offered by outside owners to a ttract managers into two period projects translates 
into the continuation cost c of keeping firms open in the Hopenhayn (1992) model. 
This "loan" is also the cost of prolonging the use of assets under outside owner­
ship. Unlike in the Hopenhayn (1992) model, both F  and c are endogenous to my 
model.
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3.5  C on clu sion
This paper developed a theory of entrepreneurs and managers in the context of 
self employment versus outside ownership of productive assets. A focal interest 
was why in capitalist societies, agents who accumulate skills specific to a set of 
disembodied assets are often hired by outside owners of such assets.
Since a fixed level of skills are acquired through learning by doing, the model 
abstracts away from how there may be underinvestment in skills due to the hold 
up problem under outside ownership. Such an argument relies on the costs of skills 
being private to the agent acquiring the skill. Since entrepreneurs unlike managers 
own the assets they produce with, a richer model could capture the prediction 
tha t entrepreneurs accumulate more skills than managers in projects. On the 
other hand, if investment is costly in output terms, the borrowing constraints 
facing entrepreneurs could deter skill investment. Different types of skills could 
be accumulated to different extents depending on whether projects are carried out 
by entrepreneurs or managers.
Another extension would be to have agents who live for four or more periods, 
so they can carry out more than one project in their lifetimes. Such a model would 
predict tha t entrepreneurs remain entrepreneurs throughout their lifetimes, and 
always sell assets upon completion of virgin projects. Entrepreneurs would have 
the largest stock of accumulated wealth, and are in the best position to overcome 
borrowing constraints which characterize entrepreneurship in the current model.
Finally, this paper sets out a more general research agenda by example. Tra­
ditional characterizations of firms in aggregate models have remained a black box. 
By considering the optimal ownership structure of assets and the mode of produc­
tion explicitly, stronger microfoundations can be revealed (or not revealed) in the 
current modelling of firms in aggregate economies.
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4 Skill A ccum ulation  in th e  Search U nem ploy­
m ent M odel
This chapter analyses the correlation between employment duration, unemploy­
ment duration and general skill accumulation in a search equilibrium. A classic 
topic in development economics is the correlation of labour force participation in 
the formal, employment sector with the level of development. W hen richer coun­
tries are characterized by lower unit costs of skills and higher skill levels, I derive 
implications for unemployment and job tenure durations, and the feedback be­
tween such variables and skill levels. The duality of labor markets highlighted by 
Harris and Todaro (1970), has in the past been explained using a labor turnover 
model by Stiglitz (1974). The need for an updated analysis along these lines 
has been recently emphasized by Basu (1997). Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
present a canonical model of endogenous job duration in a search unemployment 
framework. The extension of that analysis to general skill accumulation consti­
tutes the core of my paper.
W ith search frictions in matching unemployed workers with job vacancies, the 
marginal benefit of skills is higher in current matches than in future matches 
since re-matching takes time. This implies tha t matches become more resilient 
towards idiosyncratic shocks, and the expected duration of matches is longer, 
when skill levels are higher. For the same reason, search frictions imply that the 
bilateral surplus created between workers and vacancies opened by entrepreneurs, 
is increasing in general skill levels.
Entrepreneurs who open vacancies receive a fixed share of this surplus. Under 
free entry of vacancies, a higher surplus translates into a higher vacancy to unem­
ployment ratio, as entrepreneurs “compete” for workers by opening job vacancies. 
For workers this means that unemployment durations on average are shorter. Since 
general skills are only productive within matches, longer employment durations 
and shorter unemployment spells improve the incentives for general skill accumu­
6 6
lation. Thus, I show how the level of general skills and the duration of employment 
are positively correlated, and both variables are negatively correlated with the 
duration of unemployment spells.
A natural question which arises in analyzing the correlations above is (i) who 
finances the acquisition of general skills and (ii) is the level of general skill ac­
cumulation efficient? W ith search frictions both entrepreneurs and workers have 
incentives to pay for general skills, since the bilateral surplus is increasing in skill 
levels. Under Nash Bargaining of the bilateral surplus, the Becker (1975) rule 
for general skill finance (workers pay for all of it) is modified in an intuitive way. 
Employers pay for their bargaining share of total skill cost minus the appreciation 
in the workers outside option resulting from skill accumulation. Skill accumula­
tion has two effects, increasing the bilateral surplus and improving the worker’s 
outside option and  bargaining power. Since the entrepreneur cannot appropriate 
any share of the improvement in the worker’s outside option, the level of the en­
trepreneur’s skill finance is exactly his bargaining share of total skill finance less 
the unappropriable share.
Workers acquire general skills with the first vacancy they are matched with. I 
assume skills do not depreciate throughout workers’ lifetimes. Since the marginal 
productivity of workers’ general skills is shared with future entrepreneurs who 
workers expect to be matched with, general skill accumulation is subject to a hold 
up problem. However, if entrepreneurs open vacancies which are directed towards 
workers of different skill levels, workers will indirectly be able to internalize the 
externality of skill accumulation, through shorter unemployment spells.
Besides the hold up problem associated with general skill accumulation, the 
search employment economy is subject to further externalities resulting from (i) 
job separations causing a negative externality to the pool of existing unemployed 
workers, and (ii) job creations causing a positive externality on the pool of existing 
unemployed workers. Hosios (1990) identified a condition under which these latter 
externalities exactly cancel each other out. I show how given the Hosios condition,
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with free entry of vacancies, and directed search by vacancies to workers of differ­
ent skill levels, general skill accumulation is fully efficient. Under these conditions, 
workers are exactly internalizing the externality generated by skill accumulation 
011 future entrepreneurs tha t workers expect to be matched with. Meanwhile, if 
vacancies do not direct their search to skilled and unskilled workers, the economy 
is subject to coordination failure. Workers are unable to internalize the exter­
nality of their skill accumulation decisions. I discuss conditions under which skill 
accumulation is distorted in different directions.
Compared to the Becker analysis, the search framework predicts a larger range 
of skills are accumulated through training than education. I assume skills acquired 
through education (before entering the labour market) and training (acquired 
upon being matched with first job) are perfect substitutes in production. Then 
for Becker, skills whose unit costs are lower under education are accumulated 
through education and otherwise through training. In my analysis, a range of 
skills whose costs are lower under education are accumulated through training, 
since (i) entrepreneurs participate in the financing of training and (ii) getting the 
first job takes time so workers discount the benefits of skills acquired through 
education.
Individual differences in the unit costs of skill accumulation through education 
give rise to two distinct classes of workers: “white collar” workers who accumulate 
skills through education and “blue collar” workers who accumulate skills through 
training. Even small differences in unit costs of skill accumulation can lead to 
discrete differences in skill levels when one group acquires skills through education 
and another acquires skills through training. W hite collar workers who accumulate 
skills through education have discretely longer employment duration and lower 
unemployment duration.
W ith search frictions, the duration of matches is increasing in job specific 
skills as well. Ceteris paribus, optimal specific skill accumulation maximizes the 
bilateral surplus of job matches, and minimizes the unemployment duration of
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workers. In turn, specific skills respond positively to the expected duration of 
employment. General and job specific skills complement each other indirectly 
through the expected duration of employment matches.
In a full employment framework, general skill accumulation decisions under 
search frictions and exogenous job destruction have been studied by Acemoglu 
(1997). Non-directed search by vacancies was assumed in th a t paper. Acemoglu 
and Shimer (1998) have shown how the externality generated by firms’ specific 
(physical) capital decisions can be indirectly internalized, when workers exercise 
directed search towards vacancies following wage posting by firms. The paper 
begins by introducing the skill accumulation process through training. The de­
scription of equilibrium is followed by efficiency results and analysis of the econ­
omy with non-directed search. The extensions cover education and specific skill 
accumulation. The last section concludes with suggestions for future research.
4.1  M o d e l
There are two types of agents in the economy: entrepreneurs and workers. Every­
one is risk neutral and non-wealth constrained. The share of entrepreneurs in the 
population is fixed and the size of the labor force who are workers is normalized 
to l .24
General skills k are embodied in workers and workers can utilize these skills 
in different matches. Entrepreneurs have a large set of ideas they can implement, 
and the only shocks in the economy are idea specific ones, and all ideas have an 
identical and independent productivity distribution at the point of implementation 
(when idea and worker are first matched).24
Productive matches are bilateral (between one worker and one idea), implying 
the production function is Leontieff. The productivity flow of a particular idea-
J ! T h is  p ap e r concen tra tes  on th e  worker side of th e  economy. T h e  analysis of en trep ren eu rs  
is tr iv ia l in th is economy.
■ 1 T h e  dom inace of plant or firm specific id iosyncratic  shocks in gross jo b  flows is well 
d o cum en ted . See th e  survey by D avis and H altiw anger (1998).
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worker match is given by,
f ( k )  + xo  where f  > 0, f "  < 0 (49)
The general and idea specific components of productivity are additive .25 For each 
idea, x E [x, .x], and at the point of idea implementation x = x. The motivation for 
the last assumption is tha t only the latest and most productive ideas are adopted 
at any given time. Bilateral matches are subject to idea specific shocks at Poisson 
rate A which give rise to draws of x from a fixed distribution F(x)  with E(x) = 0 
for each idea. When idea specific draws yield a productivity below an optimally 
determined destruction margin R,  bilateral matches are term inated .25
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Figure 8 : Lifetime of a worker
[Figure 8] documents the possible lifetime paths of workers. All agents are 
subject to Poisson death shocks at rate 5, which causes their asset values to drop 
to  zero. 1 assume zero interest rates such that the discount rate of the economy
25 T h is  fo rm u la tion  is im p o rtan t for th e  q u a lita tiv e  resu lts . In  som e p as t stud ies , skill levels 
were m u ltip lica tive  to  th e  id isyncra tic  shock com ponent, b u t it is unclea r w hy general skill levels 
shou ld  increase th e  variance of id io syncra tic  shocks.
E x p o rted  em ploym ent tenure  is then  given by xf(R) •
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is equal to the death rate. The assumption of zero interest rates is adopted to 
facilitate the welfare analysis later.
The skill accumulation decision or workers is made when an unskilled worker 
is matched with his first entrepreneur. Skill accumulation is instantaneous. Then, 
all production occurs with workers who have been skilled. I assume th a t the 
productivity of matches is not verifiable by third parties. This assumption is used 
to separate out the output sharing decision from the skill finance sharing decision 
and will allow me to pin down and analyze a particular optimal skill finance sharing 
rule.
Entrepreneurs direct vacancies to workers of differentiated skill levels.2' At 
any given point in time the distribution of workers with particular skills and the 
distribution of vacancies searching for particular workers is common knowledge. 
In equilibrium, only two types of vacancies will be observed, those opened for 
unskilled workers and those opened for workers skilled at the equilibrium level.
Search frictions in the matching of workers to vacancies are governed by a 
constant returns to scale match function with the measure of vacancies and unem­
ployed workers as arguments. The flow of skilled worker-idea matches is given 
by M  =  M (u s, v ),and the flow of unskilled worker-idea matches is given by 
M  = M{  1 — s,v). us is the unemployed share of the labor force who are skilled, v 
the measure of vacancies opened to skilled workers, s the skilled share of the labor 
force, and v the measure of vacancies opened for unskilled workers.
Let 0 =  —. 6 =  —r denote the labour market tightness for skilled and un-us ’ ( 1 - 5 )  O
skilled workers respectively. m{6), rn(6) are the respective arrival rates of entrepre­
neurs to skilled and unskilled workers. —(^  =  q(6), ~ =  q(P) are the respective 
arrival rates of skilled and unskilled workers to entrepreneurs.28 The elasticity of
the arrival rate of workers r? =  — — > 0 is assumed constant.
' 9(0) q(6)
27 T h is  necessarily  im plies general skill levels are  verifiable, an d  skill con tingen t tran sfe rs  can  
be im p lem en ted  w ith in  m atches.
2H T h e  expec ted  unem ploym ent d u ra tio n s  for skilled and  unsk illed  w orkers are  given by 
respectively.
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I assume tha t on-the-job search is less intensive than th a t off the job, and rule 
out on-the-job search altogether for simplicity.
4.1.1 Entrepreneurs
Given tha t entrepreneurs can implement several ideas at the same time, ideas 
are independent and each entrepreneur can only have a t most one idea in each 
method, each idea can be analyzed in isolation. Since each method can also be 
analyzed in isolation I drop indices for method for notational convenience.
Entrepreneurial ideas can be in three different states: matched with a skilled 
worker, searching for a skilled worker (skilled vacancy) and searching for an un­
skilled worker (unskilled vacancy). The steady state asset value of idea i matched 
with a skilled worker of skill level k is given by,
6 J (k , x) = f ( k ) + xa  — w (k , x) 4- A /  [max{ J(k,  x), 0} — J(k,  x)]dF{x) — 5J(k, x)
(50)
The flow of expected output to entrepreneurs consists of the product net of wage 
plus the capital appreciations following productivity shocks minus the capital de­
preciations following the death of the worker.29 The outside option of the idea once 
it has been matched is zero since entrepreneurs weakly prefer to open new ideas 
as opposed to re-opening old ones. Assume tha t old ideas are never re-opened.
The asset value of a skilled vacancy searching for a worker of skill level k is 
given by,
SV(k)  =  - c  + q(e)(J(k,x)  -  V(k))  (51)
c is the per period cost of recruitment and its level is assumed the same for all 
skill levels. During the match process, the identity of skilled workers who will 
be matched to particular vacancies is unknown so entrepreneurs cannot commit 
to skill contingent transfers before matches occur. Once matches are realized the 
incentive for vacancies to offer such contracts disappears.
29 T h e  o th e r asset equa tions are stra igh tfo rw ard .
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The asset value of an unskilled vacancy is given by,
5V =  _ c  +  q(9)(J(k, x) -  i k e -  V)  (52)
.J—'yke is simply the initial asset value of an idea matched with an unskilled worker, 
where ^  is the unit cost of skill accumulation, k — ke +  kw, skill accumulation 
consists of tha t financed by entrepreneurs and that financed by workers.
4.1 .2  W orkers
Workers can find themselves in three different states: skilled and employed, skilled 
and unemployed and unskilled. The asset value of a skilled worker matched with 
idea i is given by,
S\V(k,x)  = w { k , x )+A f [ m a x{W (k ,x ) ,U (k ) }  — W(k ,x)]dF(x)+5(U(k)  — W (k ,x ) )
(53)
The asset value of a skilled worker searching for a match is given by,
5U(k) = max{(5U, a +  m(9){W{k,  x) -  U(k))} (54)
a is the income derived from labour outside the employment sector. Workers 
skilled in a, particular method are unskilled in all other methods so always have 
an option to search for unskilled worker vacancies. Throughout the analysis, I 
assume that a +  m (8)(W (k ,x )  — U(k) > SU V/c > 0, and later verify this must 
be true in equilibrium.
The asset value of an unskilled worker searching for a match is given by,
5U = a +  m(9)(W{k,  x) -  7 kw -  U) (55)
W(k,  x) — 7 kw is the initial asset value of an unskilled worker matched with his first 
entrepreneur. Although skills can be acquired outside matches, I assume tha t it
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is optimal to delay the skill accumulation decision until the first match is realized. 
The conditions under which this assumption is valid are verified in the extension 
on education.
4.1.3 B argaining
Nash Bargaining is adopted throughout. In a match between an entrepreneur’s 
idea and a skilled worker the Nash Bargaining Rule for Wages is given by,
ii'*(h. .i) — argm ax ( J ( k . x ) Y ~ 3(W (k ,x )  — U{k))8 given .t, k (56)
where B is the workers’ bargaining share. The wage rule determines a renegotiation 
proof rule for the division of output. In particular this occurs since wage contracts 
contingent on the level of productivity cannot be enforced. Wages are bargained 
over given k since the skill investment has already been sunk either in a previous 
match of the worker or at the beginning of the current m atch .30
Let S (k ,x )  =  ( J (k ,x )  +  W ( k , x )  — U(k)) denote the bilateral match surplus 
between a skilled worker and idea. The first order condition (FOC) of the wage 
bargaining rule implies tha t ideas and skilled workers receive their bargaining share 
of the match surplus,
,J(k. x) =  (1 -  0)S(k,  x) W ( k , x) -  U(k) =  0S(k ,  x) (57)
Further bargaining considerations are made when an unskilled worker is matched 
with an idea for the first time. The Nash Bargaining Rule for Skill Accumulation 
and Finance is given by,
m ax(J(£\ x) — 7 kP) l~8(W{k, x) — U — j ( k  — ke))8 (58)
Let T ( k , x) =  (J ( k , x) +  W(k,  x) — U — 7 k) denote the bilateral match surplus
-i0 A llow ing for p ro d u c tiv ity  con tingen t tran sfe rs  w ould m ean th a t  th is  sh a rin g  ru le  re la tes to  
one of an infin ite set of possible op tim al sharing  rules.
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between an unskilled worker and entrepreneur idea. The FOC for ke implies that 
ideas and unskilled workers receive their bargaining share of the match surplus,
,J(k. x) -  7 k* =  (1 -  f3)T(k, x) W(k ,  x) — U — k*w = 0T(k ,  x) (59)
Due to non-verifiable productivity, the division of output and the division of 
skill finance become independent problems. Substituting in the wage bargaining 
rule (56) for x = x, gives us the Skill Finance Rule,
7 *; =  (1 -  fl)(7 fc -  ( u ( k )  -  U)) (60)
Skill accumulation has two effects, increasing the bilateral surplus and improv­
ing the workers outside option and bargaining power. Since the entrepreneur can­
not appropriate any share of the improvement in the worker’s bargaining power, 
the level of the entrepreneur’s skill finance is exactly his bargaining share of total 
skill finance less the unappropriable share. This modifies the Becker general skill 
finance rule for the search employment economy.
Since I assume that skill contingent transfers are contractible (between well de­
fined contractual parties, namely a matched worker and entrepreneur), skill levels 
are set to maximize the asset value of the worker and entrepreneur’s idea. How­
ever, this optimal skill accumulation rule can also be interpreted as the outcome 
of Nash Bargaining.31 The Skill Accumulation Rule is given by,
k* =  arg max{ J(/c, x) + W ( k , x) — U — ^ k } = arg max{ J(/c, x) +  W(k,  x) — 7 k}
(61 )
Skill accumulation is made taking U as given since this is a function of skill 
accumulation outside the current match.
'u So th e  verifiablity  of skills is not a necessary assum ption  for th e  Skill A ccum ula tion  Rule.
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4.2  E q u ilib riu m
4.2.1 Skilled W orker Sector
The model is solved as follows. First take the skilled worker endogenous variables: 
the skill accumulation level k, the job destruction margin R,  the vacancy to un­
employment ratio for skilled workers (9, and the wage rate for workers W{ (note all 
wage earners are skilled). These are solved using the following four rules.
Job Destruction Rule S(x  =  R) =  J(R)  4- W (R )  — U(R)  =  0 
Free Entry Rule V(k) — 0 
Nash Bargaining Rule for Wages
w*(k, x ) =  arg max( J(/c, x) ) l~l3{W(k, x) — U (k)Y  given x, k 
Skill Accumulation Rule k* — arg max{ J(k,  x) T  W(k,  x) — 7 k}
A feature of the Skill Accumulation Rule is tha t the decision internalizes the 
effect that skill levels have on the labour market tightness 6, faced by the worker. 
This is a feature of vacancies exercising directed search to workers of different skill 
levels.
The following equilibrium conditions are derived in Appendix A.
For each idea i the Job Destruction Equation is,
\ / t  C  ( nr*   ^  ( J
l f (k)  + R*a] +  y ^ (  1 -  F(x))dx = [a +  m(0)P— 1 (62)
This says the lowest acceptable productivity of a match plus the option value of 
retaining the existing match in anticipation of productivity improvements equals 
the opportunity cost of employment.
Differentiating the Job Destruction Equation with respect to k we get,
- ™ > « f - T T P I  ■ «
If the opportunity cost of employment is constant, a higher skill level which in­
creases the productivity of matches implies tha t the destruction margin must fall.
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This is for two reasons, (i) the productivity within the current match is higher 
than elsewhere (second term  of LHS), and (ii) the option value of retaining the 
current match is higher (third term  of LHS). The opportunity cost of employment 
does respond positively to the skill level since as in the current match, skills reduce 
the destruction margin of future matches and improve the rematch probabilities 
of workers. Since both these effects are conditional on skills lowering the destruc­
tion margin of the current match, overall the destruction margin must respond 
negatively to skill levels.
From the Job Destruction Rule S(x) — S(R)  = S(x) ,  the bilateral surplus 
created by a match between an idea and a skilled worker can be rewritten as a 
direct function of the destruction margin only,
So from the equation for S(x)  we know tha t < 0 dSd^  > 0. The 
destruction margin responding negatively with respect to skill levels is equivalent 
to the statem ent that the match surplus between an entrepreneurial idea and 
skilled worker is increasing in skill levels, given the exogenous param eters of our 
model.
The Job Creation Equation is,
Entrepreneurs receive fixed shares of the bilateral surplus. Increases in the surplus 
which occur through reductions in the destruction margin, will invite entry into 
the competitive vacancy market and increase 0.
Differentiating the Job Creation Equation with respect to k one gets,
(64)
Note tha t -  =  ^  =  f -2 <5+A dk dk
dR _ 28 + X d S  r) d6
~  ^  A L  ~  ~L)^X  ~  'dk a dk 0 dk
( 6 6 )
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Since entrepreneurs appropriate a share of the match surplus, higher skill levels 
will invite entry of vacancies into the market for skilled workers and increase the 
tightness of the market for skilled workers.
The comparative statics imply < 0, §f > 0- 
The Skill Accumulation Equation is,
i S 4- m (9)~
1   v ' q ( ( \7 \
f ' ( k ' )  ~  7 <5[2i +  XF(R) + m (6>)f]
This equation implies | |  < 0, | |  > 0. The marginal productivity of skills in im-
proving the option value of retaining existing matches is decreasing in the destruc­
tion margin. This implies tha t the marginal productivity of skills in improving 
the match surplus is decreasing in the destruction margin. The m(0)^  term in 
the numerator captures the fact tha t when unemployment durations are shorter 
the marginal productivity of general skills is higher during the worker’s lifetime. 
The same term in the denominator captures the fact tha t shorter unemployment 
durations reduce the expected duration of any match.
P roposition  1 U nem ploym ent duration is decreasing and job tenure increas­
ing in  the level o f general skills. General skills are decreasing in  unem ploym ent 
duration and increasing in job tenure.
Comparative statics thus reveal a feedback effect between the skill level and 
labor market variables. Skill levels are positively correlated with the match dura­
tions and negatively correlated to unemployment durations of skilled workers. The 
higher job turnover rate (implied by a higher destruction margin) in countries with 
lower skill accumulation has been documented by several studies [OECD (1994), 
Roberts and Tybout (1996)]. The longer duration of unemployment for formal 
sector skilled and unskilled workers in poorer countries provides an explanation 
for their lower formal sector labour force participation rates.
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The Wage Equation is,
w*(k) = p ^ f ( k )  + x a -  ( a  + m(#)/3^  +  ^ ) ^  +  a +  m ( 6 )p a^  +  ^  (68)
\ \ ’ag('s consist of the opportunity cost of employment plus the workers’ share of 
the flow surplus from the match. Wages are increasing in 9 which is increasing in 
the skill level, reflecting that as skills become less de facto specific, wages approach 
the marginal product of the match'W
4.2 .2  U nskilled  W orker Sector
The remaining endogenous variables, the vacancy to unemployment ratio for un­
skilled workers 0, and the entrepreneur share of general skill finance ke, are solved 
by backwards induction using the solutions from the skilled worker sector and the 
following two rules,
Skill Finance Rule 7 k*e = (1 -  P){^k* -  (U{k*) -  U ) f 6 
No Skill Arbitrage Rule V(k*) =  V
The second rule says the value of a vacancy searching for workers of the equi­
librium skill level, is equivalent, to that searching for unskilled workers.
Combining these rules with the Free Entry Rule yields the Job Creation Con­
dition for Unskilled Workers,
 =  U ( k \  x) +  W ( k \ x )  - U -  7  V ) =  T* (69)
g(8 ) ( l - / 3 )
Increases in the vacancy to unemployment ratio for unskilled workers reflect in­
creases in the initial surplus of a match between an idea and an unskilled worker.
Both the solved asset equation for unskilled workers and unemployed skilled 
workers are linear in their respective labor market tightness measures. The differ-
i2 T h is  W age E q u a tio n  for skilled w orkers defines th e  im plicit labo r co n trac t offered by a 
vacancy to  th e  skilled w orker it is m a tch ed  w ith.
u  T h is rule in con junction  w ith th e  W age E quation  for skilled w orkers defines th e  co n trac t 
offered by a vacancy to  a  unskilled w orker it is m atched  w ith .
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ence in these asset values is given by,
f i n  r  Sc(e ~~e) /7fn
H k ) ~ U  = W=fi ( 7 0 )
Substituting this into the Skill Finance Rule yields the equilibrium level of entre­
preneur skill finance.
I claimed earlier tha t U(k) > U V7c > 0. The Skill Finance Rule and No Skill 
Arbitrage Rule imply,
C = (1 -  /J)(7*  -  (U(k) -  U)) (71)<?W q{6)
Combining the last two equations, for all k > 0 we must have 6 > 6 => U(k) > 
U. k,  > 0. The expected unemployment duration for skilled workers is shorter. 
Unemployed skilled workers never prefer to behave like an unskilled worker. The 
entrepreneur share of skill finance is never negative.
4.2.3 U nem ploym ent
The steady state share of skilled workers out of total workers is a direct positive 
function of the vacancy to unemployment ratio for unskilled workers,
s =  (72)
m{9) +  5
The steady state share of skilled and unemployed workers out of total workers is 
a positive function of the vacancy to unemployment ratio for skilled workers and 
a negative function of the job destruction margin,
, S + XF(R) _
” m{8) + 2S + \ F ( R )  1 1
The share of workers who are unemployed is given by one minus the share of
workers who are employed,
, m(9)  +  5 m(9)
u = l  — (s — u )  = l -------------- — ------------------- — —" 1 m(9) + 25 + \F(R)m(9) + 6
Higher equilibrium skill levels are associated with lower i?, and higher {#,9). Skill 
levels are thus correlated with a larger share of the workforce who are skilled and 
a larger share of the skilled who are employed.
4.2 .4  Efficiency
This section highlights how workers indirectly internalize the positive externality 
that their skill accumulation decisions have on future entrepreneurs they expect 
to be matched with. Given 9, workers’s skill accumulation generates a positive 
externality on the share of the match surplus (1 — (3)S, enjoyed by future entrepre­
neurs who workers expect to be matched with. The marginal externality of skill 
accumulat ion is given byy
M _  d S W
[ P) 8 dk
Where (1 — is the flow of marginal externalities to future entrepreneurs
which arrive a t rate m(0), and this is normalized by the discount rate of the 
economy to yield a stock measure.
If vacancies undertake directed search to workers of different skill levels, work­
ers internalize the effect tha t skill accumulation has on their outside option through 
improved matching prospects m{9).  The flow of marginal product of skills through 
improved match prospects is given by m ' (9)^(3 S. Using (66), and the definition 
of the elasticity of the arrival rate of workers 77, the flow of this marginal product 
can be rewritten as ^(1 — The stock of marginal productivity through
improved job prospects is then given by,
Under the Hosios condition rj =  3, the externality of skill accumulation is exactly 
internalized through improved match prospects. The free entry of vacancies and 
directed search by vacancies, together with the Hosios condition ensure general 
skill accumulation is efficient. By inspection, when 77 >  /3, there will be under­
investment in skills, and when // < 3 there will be over-investment in skills.
More generally one can define the social planner’s problem and show how under 
the assumed conditions, the outcomes under a competitive equilibrium coincide 
exactly with those of the social planner. The social planner’s problem is given by,
/ "  /  [(1 -  s) +  U,]a -  [t> +  v]c +  (s -  u,)f(k) . _s
max Y  — / < } e at (75)
S,us ,v,v,k JQ _j_^s  _  _|_ bE(x\x  > R)i7 — M'yk
subject to the search friction constraints,
ds ,— = M  — Ss dt
d^S ~ U^  =  M  +  M  -  (25 +  AF(R)) (s  -  u s)dt
db A(1 -  F(R))
(M  +  M) -  (25 +  XF(R))b  (76)
dt 25 +  A
The social planner maximizes the discounted flow of net income streams, b denotes 
the measure of workers who are in matches where idea specific productivity is not 
at the supremum, x ^  x.
P ro p o s itio n  2 Given the Hosios Condition for no search externalities, the 
free entry of vacancies and directed search by vacancies, the solution to the social 
planner’s problem: is identical to outcomes under the competitive equilibrium.
Proof in the Appendix B.
Assuming the discount rate is equal to the death rate of the economy simplifies 
the welfare analysis by allowing us to directly compare steady state solutions of the 
social planning and real economy rather than having to determine the discounted 
value of the change in some variable along a convergent path from one solution to
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the other. Otherwise the assumption tha t the interest rate is zero is inessential.
Acemoglu (1997) identifies a hold up problem which arises from workers being 
unable to directly internalize the benefits th a t their skill accumulation has on 
future entrepreneurs they expect to be matched with. This is because the identity 
of the future entrepreneurs or vacancies is unknown and contracts cannot specify 
parties to the contract. Here, this underinvestment is mitigated since workers 
are able to indirectly internalize this externality through higher expected match 
rates given the Free Entry Condition: competition solves the hold up problem. 
Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) have discussed a similar mechanism for the case of 
entrepreneurs making match specific ex ante physical investments before opening 
vacancies.
4.2 .5  E q u ilib riu m  w ith  N o n -d ire c te d  S earch
When the same type of vacancy is opened for workers of every skill level we have 
non-directed search. By construction then, 0 = 6 = yTThT- asse  ^ equation 
for vacancies becomes,
5V = - c  + q ( 0 ) ( J ( k . x ) ------ 1 - 5  K - V )  (77)
1 — s +  us
The expected capital gain through matches is a weighted average of the gains 
through being matched with a skilled worker and being matched with an unskilled 
worker. The skill accumulation rule is modified to,
k* = arg max{ J(k,  x) + W ( k , x )  — 7 k}  given 6 (78)
Under non-directed search, the tightness of the market becomes an aggregate 
variable, changes of which are not internalized by individual worker-entrepreneur 
matches. The new skill accumulation equation,
1 S + m(6)p ^
f '{k*) 7 <S[2 (5 +  A F(R)  +  m(0)(3]
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reflects the underinvestment which results from this externality. Qualitatively, the 
feedback between k and {R, 0} is unchanged, but some of the feedback between k 
and 6 is not captured.
The externality that workers cannot internalize consists of the effect of skill 
levels on future re-match probabilities. This has a positive and negative feedback 
effect. Higher rematch probability implies workers should invest more (this is 
represented by the second term on the numerator), but the same effect implies 
that workers exaggerate the effect of skills on lowering the destruction margin 
such tha t workers should invest less (this is represented by the third term  in 
brackets on the denominator). Overall there is under-investment by workers, and 
the positive feedback implies the existence of coordination failure.
4 .3  E x ten sio n s
4.3.1 E ducation
In the classic Becker (1975) analysis, the decision to acquire skills through training 
or education follows a simple rule. For skills where the marginal cost is lower in 
training, acquire them on the job, and otherwise acquire them through education.34
The education decision is set to solve,
h* =  arg max{C/(/r) — a j h }  s.t. h > 0 (80)
Where a  £ (0,1] denotes the relative cheapness of education. For Becker, workers 
would accumulate all these skills through education.
The education decision is solved by backward induction given the solutions 
from the unskilled sector, which in turn  are solved by backward induction given 
the solutions from the skilled sector. Define the level of training t =  k — h > 0.
!l T h is is th e  case assum ing  in s tan tan eo u s  skill accum ulation .
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The new Job Creation Condition for Unskilled Workers is,
—^ -----------  =  J(k*, x) +  W(k*,  x) — U(h) — 7 /c* +  7/1 for h < k* (81)
q(9) (  1 - /3 )
=  J(h. x) 4- W{h,  x) -  U(h) for h > k*
When the level of education exceeds the optimizing training level h > h*, there is 
no longer a distinction between skilled and unskilled workers in the search market, 
i.e. 9 =  9, U — U. Substituting in for equilibrium U, U this condition maps a 
continuous monotonic increasing relationship between equilibrium 6 and h.
The marginal benefit of education is given by,
dU{h)  =  7  m m  > 0  { o r h < k . (82)
dh r)5 + rn(6)/3
_  d ( J ( h , x ) +  W(h ,x ) )  m(6)p
dh 7)5 +  m{9)(5
> 0  for h > k*
Since d{.J(h’x)+w(h’x)) = ^  h — h* ? marginal benefit function is continuous 
in h. Since aU(fr4UT(^x).) < ^  when h > k*, < 7  f o r  \/9 < 00 . So when
n = l. workers strictly prefer to accumulate skills through training, and buy no 
education; h* = 0 the corner solution. Due to discounting and the sharing of skill 
finance, training is superior to education. Education has some marginal benefit 
in improving the match probabilities of workers virgin to the labor market but, 
this benefit is strictly dominated in the case of equal unit costs of training and 
education.
There exists a critical a* < 1 defined by,
U{h*) -  a*h* = U(h = 0) where h* > 0 (83)
For a particular method of skills j ,  if ay > a* workers prefer to accumulate these 
skills through training, and otherwise they prefer to accumulate skills through 
education. So compared to the Becker analysis, the set of skills accumulated
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through training is larger in a labor market characterized by search frictions.
If h < k*, since 6 is monotonically increasing in h, the marginal benefit of 
education is increasing in the level of education. If h > k*, this process slows down 
and eventually the marginal benefit is falling in education, although it remains 
positive. Given th a t the marginal cost of education is constant, these statements 
imply tha t h* > k*h given otj < a*. When education is optimally purchased for a 
particular skill, it is never ‘topped-up’ by training following the first job match.
Both improvements in the productivity of matches and lower unit cost of skills 
7 , are channels through which economic development can occur. Both effects 
raise the marginal productivity of education schedule relative to its marginal costs 
schedule which implies th a t the cut off a* increases. The range of skills accumu­
lated through education increases through the development process.
Overall, the analysis of education in a search economy highlights the ‘back­
wards induction’ feature of education incentives. The decision to educate or train 
is subtle: the incentives to buy education are derived from the employment op­
portunities available in the job market and the degree to which the unit costs of 
education are cheaper than tha t of training.
W h ite  v e rsu s  B lue  C o lla r W orkers
The analysis on education suggests sharp predictions about the formation of 
distinct classes of workers in the economy. Workers with different unit costs of 
skills may exhibit qualitatively different patterns of skill accumulation. The cut 
off margin for relative costs of education will be higher for workers with lower 
unit costs of skill accumulation, a*L > a*H given < 7 #. If im portant skills 
are characterized by relative costs of education d, and a*L > a  > a *H, workers 
with the higher unit costs (blue collar workers) buy no education and become 
skilled only once matches with entrepreneurs are realized. Blue collar workers 
train  within matches to skill level k*, whereas workers with low unit costs (white 
collar workers) accumulate all their skills through education, to a level h* > k* 
(strictly higher skill levels). W hite collar workers will have longer average tenure,
lower unemployment duration and higher specific skill accumulation.
4.3.2 Specific Skill A ccu m u la tio n
The productivity flow of a particular entrepreneur-worker match, is now a function 
of idea specific skills
g(z) + xa where g' > 0 ,g" < 0 (84)
It is also convenient to allow agents to live forever by getting rid of death shocks, 
so the death rate should now be interpreted as the interest rate. For vacancies, all 
searching workers are now identical, so the issue of whether search is directed or 
not is irrelevant. The asset value of a matched idea i, after specific skill investments 
have been sunk is given by,
SJ(z , x )  = g(z) + xa — w(z,x) + \ J  [m&x{ J(z, x), 0} — J(z, x)]dF(x) (85)
The asset value of an idea searching for a worker is given by,
SV =  - c  +  q{Q)(J -  v z e -  V)  (86)
The asset value of a worker matched with an idea, after specific skill investment
has been sunk is given by,
5 W(z,x) = w(z,x) + A J[nmx{W{z, x), U} — W(z, x)]dF(x) (87)
The asset value of a worker searching for a job is given by,
5U = a +  m(6) (W  -  uzw - U) (88)
Where z = ze + zw.
ir’ Again we assum e th a t specific skill levels do not increase th e  variance of id io syncra tic  shocks.
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Again productivity contingent transfers are ruled out and wages are set to
maximize the Nash Product for Wages once the specific investment is sunk,
w*(z , x ) =  argm ax ( J ( z , x ) )1~l3( W( z , x )  — U)^ given x , z  (89)
Specific Skill Accumulation and Finance are determined by maximizing the 
Nash Product,
max ( J ( z , x )  — i/ze)l~l3( W ( z i x) — i/(z — ze) — U Y  (90)z,ze
The FOCs yield the Specific Skill Accumulation Rule and Skill Finance Rule,
•r* =  arg max{ J(z,  x) +  W ( z , x )  — vzi) = arg max {.9 (2 , x) — vz}  (91)
- '•  =  ( 1 - ^ ) -  (92)
Unlike general skills, specific skills do not improve the outside option of workers 
so entrepreneurs simply pay their bargaining share of the costs of specific skill 
accumulation.
From the FOC for the Skill Accumulation Rule we get the Specific Skill Accu­
mulation Equation,
 \__ -  _____ \_____  (93)
g'(z*) i/(6 +  XF(R))  K J
Intuitively, the incentives for specific skill accumulation are independent of the
matching possibilities within the economy and only a function of the expected
duration of the current match.
From the Job Destruction Rule the Job Destruction Equation is,
[g(z) +  R*a\ +  [  (1 -  F{x))dx = [a +  (94)
o +  A J  d +  A
Unlike general skills, idea specific skills have no effect on the vacancy to unem­
ployment ratio and no effect on the destruction margin of future matches of the
worker.
This implies that,
dR _  g'(z) 8 + \
dz  5 +  A F(R)  a
< 0 (95)
— ^ < 0  at Zh = z*h (96)
From the Free Entry Rule the Job Creation Equation is given by,
C =  (97)
q(6*) 8 + A
Taking differentials with respect to z,
^  de =  „ )  > 0  V* < 2«
9q{9)dz  v " J \ 5  + \ F { R )
=  0 at z =  z*
In the economy where specific skill accumulation is undertaken, the equilibrium 
specific skill level maximizes the tightness of the market.
Combining these results with the analysis for general skill accumulation, gen­
eral and specific skill are indirect complements. Higher general skills complement 
specific skills through a lower destruction margin. Optimally determined specific 
skills complement general skills through a lower destruction margin and higher 
labor market tightness for skilled workers.
4 .4  C on clu sion
I have identified the feedback linkages between general skills and specific skills, and 
between each of these skills with labor market variables. The modified Becker rule 
for general skill accumulation in a search economy together with the conditions for 
efficient skill accumulation provide analytical benchmarks for future research in 
this area. The endogenous determination of skill accumulation through training
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or education provides insights into the relationship between education and per 
capita income levels.
The propagation mechanisms developed here are confined to the worker side of 
the economy. The perfectly elastic supply of vacancies assumed in the paper needs 
to be modified in an integrated story of worker and entrepreneurial dynamics. 
The fact th a t efficient skill accumulation is conditional on free entry of vacancies 
suggests that the efficiency implications of entrepreneurial dynamics will not be 
straightforward.
The most natural extension of this work is to apply it to issues of youth unem­
ployment and training, and long term unemployment and training. This could be 
accommodated by adopting a life-cycle version of the perpetual youth over-lapping 
generations model, as explored by Gertler (1999). Workers could be in two states 
young and old where the young face a constant transition probability to become 
old and the old face a constant probability of death. The model should predict 
that the longest unemployment durations are suffered by the old unskilled, the 
shortest by the young skilled, although as a group there is more unemployment 
among the young then among the old.
A further application of this framework is to consider the importance of the first 
job for young labor market entrants. Recall the quality of the first job of workers 
will determine initial levels of general training and thus future job prospects. When 
ex ante identical young workers within a cohort are matched with first jobs of 
different quality, it is likely to create substantial within-cohort earnings inequality 
which persists throughout the careers of the cohort members. Meanwhile, were one 
to compare between cohorts who entered the labor market at different times, the 
performance of the aggregate economy at the time of labor market entry is likely 
to have a persistent effect on the earnings outcomes of different cohort members’ 
careers.
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4.5  A p p e n d ix  A: Sk illed  S ector  E q u ilib riu m
The per period income flow to an entrepreneur from idea i is,
(2d' +  A)J(k,  x) =  f ( k )  +  xa  — w(k, x) +  A J  max{ J(k,  x),  0}dF(x)
The per period surplus income flow to a skilled worker matched with idea i is, 
(26 +  A) (W(k,  x) — U) — w(k, x) +  A J  max{VF(A;, x) — U, 0}dF(x)  — 5U 
Summing we get,
(26 T X)S(k,  x) = f ( k )  + xcr +  A /  max{S(k , x ) , 0}dF(x )  — 5U
J  —oc
— f (k )  + x(T + A f  S ( k , x )dF(x )  — 6UJr
from the definition of R
(26 +  \ ) S ( k ,  R) = 0 = f ( k )  + R a  + \  [  S ( k , x )dF(x )  -  6UJr
the definition of R
so (26 +  X)(S(k,  x) -  S(k,  R)) = (26 +  X)S(k, x) = (x -  R)a
f * X  f* X
so /  S(k , x )dF(x)  = a /  (x — R)dF(x)
J r 2d +  A J R
|  [(i -  R) F ( x )}xr -  F(x)dx
26 + A
after integration by parts. 
^  J  (1 -  F{x))dx
After substituting in, the match surplus can be expressed as,
\ /»
(2d +  X)S(k,  x) =  f ( k )  +  xa  +  °  /  (1 -  F(x) )dx -  6U
2d +  A J
Setting x = R  and S ( R ) e  0 we get the Job Destruction Rule. The Free Entry
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Condition implies a positive correlation between the size of the asset value from a 
newly matched idea and the vacancy to unemployment ratio for skilled workers,
J(k,  x) =
q(0)
Combining this with the Surplus Division Rule, we get the Job Creation Equation.
From the function for the bilateral surplus and the wage bargaining rule, the 
asset value from being unemployed can be rewritten as,
« ,  =  a +  m (9)/J£ g z | )
The joint asset value of a new idea matched with an unskilled worker is,
J  + IV -  j k  =
a f  m ( 0 ) p \  a(x  -  R)
The FOC for the Skill Accumulation Rule is initially given by,
m'(0)P a(x  — R) 36 /  m (6)(3\ o dR
j  2J +A  d k ~  \  +  <5 J 2 5  + X ~ d k = 1
The marginal productivity and marginal cost of skills are equated. The first 
term  in the LHS captures the effect that skill levels have on the workers individual 
rematch probability (conditional 011 directed search) and the second term captures 
the effect that skill levels have on improving the size of current and future expected 
match surpluses. Substituting in the equilibrium equations for , §f we get the 
Skill Accumulation Equation.
The wage equation is solved by substituting in equilibrium J, W, U into the 
surplus division rule.
4 .6  A p p en d ix  B: E fficien cy
The current value Hamiltonian of the social planner’s problem is given by,
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H ( s , u s, v , v , k )  = [(1 -  s) +  us]a — [v +  v]c — (s — us) f ( k )
+  (s — us — b)xa bE(x\x R)a — M'yk 
+ li(M  +  M  -  {25 +  AF(R)) (s  -  us))
+ 0 (M — 5s)
+7r ( A(123 +  A?))(Aif + M ) ~  {2S +  X F {R ')')b)
The partial FOCs imply,
_  f ( k )  +  2<r -  a -  
dus ~  ^  ^  _  25 + AF(R)  + M u,
d H  (E(x\x > R) — x)a
—  =  0 ^  7T =  2<5 +  AF(R)
dH c A(1 -  F(R))
~dv = W v = fl + W 25 + X
The equivalence of this with the Job Creation Equation for skilled workers implies 
tha t decentralized entry of vacancies for skilled workers is efficient.
+  M u. (/-'• + 7T 2<5 + A j
The equivalence of this with the RHS of the Job Destruction Equation implies 
tha t decentralized job destruction decisions are efficient.
d H
ds
f ( k )  + xa  -  a -  /z(M(i_s) +  25 +  A) -  7tM (i_5) A(12<5^ )) +
=  0
d H
dv 0 => Mi,
+  / i  +  7T
5 +  M(i_s)
A(1 - F ( R ) )
2 5 +  A
— 7  k
93
The equivalence of this with the Job Creation Equation for unskilled workers 
implies tha t decentralized entry of vacancies for unskilled workers is efficient.
The equivalence of this with the flow value of unskilled workers implies tha t births 
into the unskilled worker pool are efficient.
d H  ^  1 (s — us) 5 + m(9)
~dk = ^  J 7{k) = 1 M  ^  l5[28 +  AF(R)  +  m{9)}
Immediate inspection shows that skill accumulation is efficient under the Hosios
Condition.
Under the Hosios Condition, we have MUs = m(9)f i , M v — q(9)( l—(3), M (i-S) =  
m(0)p,  My = q{9)( 1 -  (5) and S  = n + T  — 0  +  // +  7t a(12^ (aR)) -  7 k.
These imply th a t the economy is fully efficient subject to search frictions as long 
as there are no search externalities.
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